Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

Complex Lit Blog

From In re Texans-Cuso Ins. Group, LLC, 421 B.R. 769 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009): The Debtor relies on section 10(a)(4) of the FAA *** for its argument that the Accounting Arbitration Award should be vacated. The FAA provides that an arbitration award may be vacated when "the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed t ...
From In re Texans-Cuso Ins. Group, LLC, 421 B.R. 769 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2009): The Debtor relies on section 10(a)(4) of the FAA *** for its argument that the Accounting Arbitration Award should be vacated. The FAA provides that an…
From Willey v. J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57826 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2009): [I]pse dixit pleading is insufficient. *** Iqbal unequivocally rejects the notion that conclusory statements unsupported by factual allegations can subject a defendant to the burdens of discovery. Quoted with approval ...
From Willey v. J.P. Morgan Chase, N.A., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57826 (S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2009): [I]pse dixit pleading is insufficient. *** Iqbal unequivocally rejects the notion that conclusory statements unsupported by factual allegations can subject a defendant to the…
From SEC v. Tambone, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5031 (1st Cir. March 10, 2010): Rule 10b-5(b), promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under the aegis of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), renders it unlawful "[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact . . . in connection with the pur ...
From SEC v. Tambone, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 5031 (1st Cir. March 10, 2010): Rule 10b-5(b), promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) under the aegis of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), renders…
From State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cohan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125653 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009): The plaintiff argues, first, that it has sufficiently alleged that the defendants constitute an "association-in-fact enterprise" for RICO purposes. RICO defines an enterprise as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or ot ...
From State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Cohan, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125653 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 2009): The plaintiff argues, first, that it has sufficiently alleged that the defendants constitute an “association-in-fact enterprise” for RICO purposes. RICO defines an…
From United States v. Boender, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20670 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2010): Unless limited by the U.S. Constitution, an Act of Congress, or a Supreme Court Rule, privileges are "governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in light of reason and experience." Fed. R. ...
From United States v. Boender, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20670 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 8, 2010): Unless limited by the U.S. Constitution, an Act of Congress, or a Supreme Court Rule, privileges are “governed by the principles of the common law…
From In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Pracs. Litig., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19752 (D. Kan. Mar. 4, 2010): In the first motion, plaintiffs sought information and documents from certain defendants relating to their communications with trade associations, weights and measures organizations and government agencies. *** Defendants objected th ...
From In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Pracs. Litig., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19752 (D. Kan. Mar. 4, 2010): In the first motion, plaintiffs sought information and documents from certain defendants relating to their communications with trade associations, weights and…
From Goldberg v. UBS AG, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19754 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2010): A district court has the discretion to certify an order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) if the court "is of the opinion that: (1) the order 'involves a controlling question of law'; (2) 'as to which there is substantial ground for d ...
From Goldberg v. UBS AG, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19754 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2010): A district court has the discretion to certify an order for interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) if the court “is of the opinion…
From Howard v. St. Germain, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4727 (5th Cir. Mar. 5, 2010): Appellants do not seek review of the district court's decision to remand. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Thus, we only consider the district court's decision to impose liability on all Appellants for Appellee's legal fees. We review a district court's awa ...
From Howard v. St. Germain, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 4727 (5th Cir. Mar. 5, 2010): Appellants do not seek review of the district court’s decision to remand. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). Thus, we only consider the district court’s decision…
From McVicker v. King, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18864 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2010): Presently before the Court is the MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA directed to non-party Trib Total Media, Inc.... For the reasons that follow, the Motion to Compel Response to Subpoena will be denied. *** On April 14, 2009, Plaintiff, William L. McVic ...
From McVicker v. King, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18864 (W.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 2010): Presently before the Court is the MOTION TO COMPEL RESPONSE TO SUBPOENA directed to non-party Trib Total Media, Inc…. For the reasons that follow, the Motion…

Recent Posts

RICO and Injunctions: (1) State Court Actions Designed to Perpetuate and Monetize a RICO Violation Are Enjoinable under RICO, Even Though They Are Not Themselves Alleged to Be Predicate Acts [Note: Noerr Pennington Applies in RICO Actions] — (2) Although Civil RICO’s Text and Legislative History Fail to Reveal Any Intent to Override the Provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, Arbitrations Are Enjoinable Under the “Effective Vindication” Doctrine Where They Operate As a Prospective Waiver of a Party’s Right to Pursue Statutory RICO Remedies — (3) Arbitration Findings May Be Given Collateral Estoppel Effect in a Civil RICO Action — (4) Injunction of Non-Corrupt State Court Litigations That Furthers a RICO Violation Are Enjoinable Under the Anti-Injunction Act’s “Expressly Authorized” Exception — (5) “The Irreparable Harm Requirement Is The Single Most Important Prerequisite For The Issuance Of A Preliminary Injunction” (Good Quote) — (6) When Injunction Is Based on “Serious Questions on the Merits” Rather Than “Likelihood of Success,” Court May Rely on Unverified Pleadings and Attached Exhibits to Assess the Merits, Unless the Opponent Has Raised Substantial Questions (Here, the Opponent Failed to Request an Evidentiary Hearing) — (7) Whether Amended Pleading Moots An Appeal Turns on Whether It Materially Changes the Substantive Basis for the Appeal — (8) Meaning of “In That” (“Used To Introduce A Statement That Explains Or Gives More Specific Information” About A Prior Statement)

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