Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

Complex Lit Blog

From Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 2011 WL 3890326 (8th Cir. Sept. 6, 2011): Mack Green and other current or former shuttle bus drivers at the Minneapolis–St. Paul International Airport (collectively Green) brought suit against SuperShuttle International, Inc., SuperShuttle Franchise Corporation, and SuperShuttle of Minnesota, ...
From Green v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., 2011 WL 3890326 (8th Cir. Sept. 6, 2011): Mack Green and other current or former shuttle bus drivers at the Minneapolis–St. Paul International Airport (collectively Green) brought suit against SuperShuttle International, Inc., SuperShuttle Franchise…
From McCreary v. Wertanen, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 27404 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2010): McCreary brought his complaint asserting violations of his constitutional rights against various employees of the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility, Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox, and Baraga County Prosecutor Joseph O'Leary. Pursuant to Federal Rule o ...
From McCreary v. Wertanen, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 27404 (6th Cir. Dec. 8, 2010): McCreary brought his complaint asserting violations of his constitutional rights against various employees of the Baraga Maximum Correctional Facility, Michigan Attorney General Mike Cox, and Baraga…
Hall v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 223,2011 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1151 (Ct. Cl. June 21, 2011): Although statutory interpretation begins with the "plain text," a court turns to "the traditional tools of statutory construction, e.g., legislative history," if the intent and meaning of a statute are not clear from its plain text. Grapevine Imp ...
Hall v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 223,2011 U.S. Claims LEXIS 1151 (Ct. Cl. June 21, 2011): Although statutory interpretation begins with the “plain text,” a court turns to “the traditional tools of statutory construction, e.g., legislative history,” if the…
From Cason v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108534 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2011): When expert testimony is challenged under Daubert, the burden of proof rests with the party seeking to present the testimony. Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998). To meet this burden, a party cannot simp ...
From Cason v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108534 (E.D. La. Sept. 21, 2011): When expert testimony is challenged under Daubert, the burden of proof rests with the party seeking to present the testimony.…
Johnson v. Hankook Tire Mfg. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20868 (5th Cir. Oct. 13, 2011): This matter arises from an attorney's improper retention of confidential materials after settlement of a case in a Texas state court. The appellant, Wesley Todd Ball (Ball), represented various plaintiffs in a case which was settled with the ap ...
Johnson v. Hankook Tire Mfg. Co., 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 20868 (5th Cir. Oct. 13, 2011): This matter arises from an attorney’s improper retention of confidential materials after settlement of a case in a Texas state court. The appellant, Wesley…
From SRI Int’l Inc. v. Internet Security Sys., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114178 (D. Del. Oct. 4, 2011): Symantec's motion presents what appears to be an issue of first impression: whether leave to amend between the liability and damages phases of a bifurcated patent trial is subject to the liberal standard set forth in Federal Rule ...
From SRI Int’l Inc. v. Internet Security Sys., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114178 (D. Del. Oct. 4, 2011): Symantec’s motion presents what appears to be an issue of first impression: whether leave to amend between the liability and damages…
From Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118529 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011): Allianz next contends that because each FMO competes "aggressively, and at cross-purposes" with every other FMO, plaintiffs are unable to prove the "common purpose" element required by Boyle. Specifically, Allianz argues that "'[i]f ...
From Negrete v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118529 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2011): Allianz next contends that because each FMO competes “aggressively, and at cross-purposes” with every other FMO, plaintiffs are unable to…
From Angelone v. Xerox Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109407 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011): This Title VII employment discrimination action stems from plaintiff's employment with defendant Xerox. See Complaint (Docket # 1). Specifically, plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against because of her gender, subjected to a continuing host ...
From Angelone v. Xerox Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109407 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2011): This Title VII employment discrimination action stems from plaintiff’s employment with defendant Xerox. See Complaint (Docket # 1). Specifically, plaintiff alleges that she was discriminated against…
From Hunt v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117607 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2011): Enzo Biochem, Inc., Heiman Gross, Barry Weiner, Elazar Rabbani, Sharim Rabbani, John Deluca, Dean Engelhardt, and John Does 1-50 (the "Enzo Defendants") bring this motion for sanctions against plaintiff Paul Lewicki and his former counsel, Dan Brecher ...
From Hunt v. Enzo Biochem, Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 117607 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2011): Enzo Biochem, Inc., Heiman Gross, Barry Weiner, Elazar Rabbani, Sharim Rabbani, John Deluca, Dean Engelhardt, and John Does 1-50 (the “Enzo Defendants”) bring this motion…
From Strand v. Dawson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115367 (C.D. Utah Oct. 4, 2011): Judges are shielded with absolute immunity from suits for money damages based on their judicial action. [Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10, 112 S. Ct. 286, 116 L. Ed. 2d 9 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225-26, 108 S. Ct. 538, 98 L. Ed. 2d 555 (198 ...
From Strand v. Dawson, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115367 (C.D. Utah Oct. 4, 2011): Judges are shielded with absolute immunity from suits for money damages based on their judicial action. [Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10, 112 S. Ct.…

Recent Posts

RICO and Injunctions: (1) State Court Actions Designed to Perpetuate and Monetize a RICO Violation Are Enjoinable under RICO, Even Though They Are Not Themselves Alleged to Be Predicate Acts [Note: Noerr Pennington Applies in RICO Actions] — (2) Although Civil RICO’s Text and Legislative History Fail to Reveal Any Intent to Override the Provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, Arbitrations Are Enjoinable Under the “Effective Vindication” Doctrine Where They Operate As a Prospective Waiver of a Party’s Right to Pursue Statutory RICO Remedies — (3) Arbitration Findings May Be Given Collateral Estoppel Effect in a Civil RICO Action — (4) Injunction of Non-Corrupt State Court Litigations That Furthers a RICO Violation Are Enjoinable Under the Anti-Injunction Act’s “Expressly Authorized” Exception — (5) “The Irreparable Harm Requirement Is The Single Most Important Prerequisite For The Issuance Of A Preliminary Injunction” (Good Quote) — (6) When Injunction Is Based on “Serious Questions on the Merits” Rather Than “Likelihood of Success,” Court May Rely on Unverified Pleadings and Attached Exhibits to Assess the Merits, Unless the Opponent Has Raised Substantial Questions (Here, the Opponent Failed to Request an Evidentiary Hearing) — (7) Whether Amended Pleading Moots An Appeal Turns on Whether It Materially Changes the Substantive Basis for the Appeal — (8) Meaning of “In That” (“Used To Introduce A Statement That Explains Or Gives More Specific Information” About A Prior Statement)

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