The pro se defendant in BidZirk, LLC v. Smith, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78481 (D.S.C. Oct. 22, 2007), was a blogger being sued for trademark infringement for improperly placing the plaintiff’s trademark on his blog. That isn’t the interesting part (the trademark claim was dismissed on summary judgment). In the course of the litigation, the plaintiff’s attorney filed a lis pendens against the defendant’s condominium apartment. The defendant promptly moved to strike it and, in response, plaintiff’s counsel defended his action by arguing to the court that the action was one ‛‘affecting title to real estate“ (a necessary precondition to the filing of a lis pendens). The District Court struck the lis pendens and concluded that, because plaintiff’s counsel ‛is a competent attorney who knew or should have known“ better, ‛the degree of Plaintiff’s counsel’s culpability weighs heavily in favor of sanctioning Plaintiff’s counsel.“ The Court imposed a $1,000 sanction payable to the defendant pursuant to Rule 11. One of the two grounds for sanctions articulated by the District Court clearly stated a violation of Rule 11 — namely, the lawyer’s unsupported argument to the Court (presumably made in writing as well as orally) that the lis pendens was justified under law. The other basis cited by the Court, the improper filing of the lis pendens originally, was certainly sanctionable, but since it did not (in the words of Rule 11(b)) involve ‛presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—“ it would have been more apt to impose sanctions for that misconduct under the inherent power of the court. You have to read a lot of sanctions cases to find one involving a pro se litigant who not only receives the sanctions award but also summary judgment, and it is the attorney on the other side who commits the sanctionable acts.