Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

Expert Opinions Not Disclosed in Report — Admitted Anyway

Rule No. 1: Know your Judge. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1), if a party fails to disclose expert opinions or exhibits in his or her Rule 26(a)(2)(B) report, the undisclosed matter is automatically excluded at trial, unless there is "substantial justification" for the failure to disclose or the "failure is harmless." That rule of exclusion is often strictly enforced. See Joseph, Sanctions: The Federal Law of Litigation Abuse § 48(E)(1) (4th ed. 2008). For a more permissive view, see Schmude v. Tricam Indus., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36688 (E.D. Wis. May 5, 2008), in which an expert was permitted to go distinctly beyond his report (evidently, even allowed to contradict it, at least implicitly):

[Defendant] Tricam's reading of the federal rules as requiring exclusion of any opinion that an expert offers in his testimony that was not disclosed in his Rule 26(a)(2) report is inconsistent with the general purpose of the rules "to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1. To disclose everything he intends to say in his testimony, an expert would need a complete list of the questions he will be asked and it would require a report as long as a transcript. Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires that the expert set forth "the substance of the direct examination." Jenkins v. Bartlett, 487 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note). By this standard, Johnson's report was sufficient.

Share this article:

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Email

Recent Posts

(1) Appellate Review of Inherent Power Sanctions (7th Circuit): Factual Findings Reviewed for Clear Error, Choice of Sanction for Abuse of Discretion — 4-Element Test for Reversal; (2) Sanctions and Class Actions: Monetary Sanctions Properly Imposed on Defendants for Improper Communications with Class Members (Represented Parties) — “[I]f The Class And The Class Opponent Are Involved In An Ongoing Business Relationship, Communications From The Class Opponent To The Class May Be Coercive” (Good Quote); (3) Monetary Sanctions under Goodyear v. Haeger: If Same Fact-Gathering Would Have Been Conducted Absent The Misconduct, No But-For Causation — But Only “Rough Justice” Required, “Not Accountant-Like Precision” (Good Quote) — Once Misconduct Is Clear, Time Spent Ferreting It Out Compensable under Goodyear; (4) Goodyear Did Not Overrule Long-Standing Rule That Courts May Impose Modest Civil Monetary Sanctions to Curb Litigation Abuse; (5) Appellate Jurisdiction Lacking Where Sanctioned Attorney Fails to File Notice of Appeal and Lawyer’s Intent to Appeal Not Apparent from Client’s Notice; (5) Rule 11 Improper Purpose — Party May Have Many Purposes for Pursuing Claim — As Long As Claim Is Supported by Good Faith Belief in the Merits, “A Parallel Reason Does Not Violate Rule 11” — To Deny A Motion for Sanctions, The District Court Need Not Address Every Argument: “Arguments Clearly Without Merit Can, And For The Sake Of Judicial Economy Should, Be Passed Over In Silence” (Good Quote); Non-Monetary Sanction on Counsel: Complete Twice The Required Amount Of Professional Responsibility Hours For Her Next Continuing Legal Education Cycle Imposed By The State Bar

Archives