Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

Sanctions — Settlement & Mootness

Fleming & Assoc’s v. Newby & Tittle, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 11764 (5th Cir. May 30, 2008) presented the following factual scenario:

September 14, 2006 — District Court issues order sanctioning plaintiffs’ counsel “for changing the [plaintiffs’] expert witness report” and orders reimbursement of certain defendants’ attorneys' fees.

September 28, 2006 — Plaintiffs’ counsel moves for reconsideration.

December 13, 2006 — Case settles; defendants forgo all rights to any attorneys' fees; plaintiffs’ counsel moves (unopposed) that the claims be dismissed with each party to bear its own “costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees.”

February 8, 2007 — Court denies reconsideration of sanctions order, even though defendants have withdrawn their objections to reconsideration.

March 6, 2007 — Magistrate Judge holds hearing and orders plaintiffs’ counsel to pay $15,214.45 in attorneys' fees, even though defendants’ counsel states that they have agreed not to collect sanctions after the settlement.

What is moot? Anything? Yes, but not everything. “[A] district court always has jurisdiction to impose sanctions designed to enforce its own rules, even after that court no longer has jurisdiction over the substance of a case” under Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 395 (1990), and Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 139 (1992).

The Fifth Circuit distinguished between (1) the District Court’s finding that plaintiffs’ counsel engaged in sanctionable behavior; and (2) its compensatory award. Held, the latter was rendered moot by the parties’ settlement, but not the former. The Fifth Circuit also indicated that if the sanction had been punitive in nature, rather than compensatory, the result may have been different.

Share this article:

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Email

Recent Posts

(1) Appellate Review of Inherent Power Sanctions (7th Circuit): Factual Findings Reviewed for Clear Error, Choice of Sanction for Abuse of Discretion — 4-Element Test for Reversal; (2) Sanctions and Class Actions: Monetary Sanctions Properly Imposed on Defendants for Improper Communications with Class Members (Represented Parties) — “[I]f The Class And The Class Opponent Are Involved In An Ongoing Business Relationship, Communications From The Class Opponent To The Class May Be Coercive” (Good Quote); (3) Monetary Sanctions under Goodyear v. Haeger: If Same Fact-Gathering Would Have Been Conducted Absent The Misconduct, No But-For Causation — But Only “Rough Justice” Required, “Not Accountant-Like Precision” (Good Quote) — Once Misconduct Is Clear, Time Spent Ferreting It Out Compensable under Goodyear; (4) Goodyear Did Not Overrule Long-Standing Rule That Courts May Impose Modest Civil Monetary Sanctions to Curb Litigation Abuse; (5) Appellate Jurisdiction Lacking Where Sanctioned Attorney Fails to File Notice of Appeal and Lawyer’s Intent to Appeal Not Apparent from Client’s Notice; (5) Rule 11 Improper Purpose — Party May Have Many Purposes for Pursuing Claim — As Long As Claim Is Supported by Good Faith Belief in the Merits, “A Parallel Reason Does Not Violate Rule 11” — To Deny A Motion for Sanctions, The District Court Need Not Address Every Argument: “Arguments Clearly Without Merit Can, And For The Sake Of Judicial Economy Should, Be Passed Over In Silence” (Good Quote); Non-Monetary Sanction on Counsel: Complete Twice The Required Amount Of Professional Responsibility Hours For Her Next Continuing Legal Education Cycle Imposed By The State Bar

Archives