Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

Article III Standing As a Prerequisite to Intervention under Rule 24 — Circuit Split

From Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118233 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 13, 2011):

Presently before the court are three motions for leave to intervene. The proposed intervenors seek leave to intervene in this action as party defendants as a matter of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), or, in the alternative, for permissive intervention under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the motions will be granted. ***

Footnote 6. Movants assert that they need not show that they have Article III standing as a prerequisite for intervention as of right. The court agrees. Although the circuit courts are split on this issue, case law in the Third Circuit indicates that Article III standing is not a prerequisite for intervention as a matter of right. See CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Phila., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14300, *5-6 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 2005) (noting that neither the Supreme Court nor the Third Circuit have indicated that Article III standing is a requisite to Rule 24 intervention and denying intervention without analyzing Article III standing). In a recent opinion, the Third Circuit noted the circuit split on this issue, but once again declined to address the issue. Am. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Murray, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 18558, *12, n.4 (3d Cir. Sept. 7, 2011).

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