Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

Class Actions — Circuit Split as to Whether Standing Should Be Addressed Prior to Class Certification

Hunnicutt v. Zeneca, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133634 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 19, 2012):

The Tenth Circuit has indicated that courts should generally address standing prior to class certification. See Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 631 F.3d 1153, 1159 (10th Cir. 2011) ("Prior to class certification, the named plaintiffs' failure to maintain a live case or controversy is fatal to the case as a whole - that unnamed plaintiffs might have a case or controversy is irrelevant."); Rector v. City and Cnty. of Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 950 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that no named plaintiff had standing to bring certain claims and remanding for decertification as to such claims). This Court and other district courts within the Tenth Circuit are in accord. Stephenson Oil Co. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 271 F.R.D. 323, 332 (N.D. Okla. 2010) ("'[I]t is well-settled that prior to the certification of a class, and technically speaking before undertaking any formal typicality or commonality review, the district court must determine that at least one named class representative has Article III standing to raise each class subclaim.'") (quoting Prado-Steiman ex rel. Prado v. Bush, 221 F.3d 1266, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2000)); Smith v. Pizza Hut, Inc., No. 09-CV-1632-CMA, 2011 WL 2791331, at * 7 (D. Colo. July 14, 2011) (declining to defer standing ruling until after class certification rulings); Thomas v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 540 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1225 (W.D. Okla. 2008) ("Plaintiffs have not persuaded the court that traditional rules requiring determination of Article III standing issues before class certification issues should not be followed here."); see also In re Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litigation, No. 09-md-02042, 2012 WL 2917365, at * 5 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 2012) (explaining that "[t]here is currently a split among federal courts as to the . . . the question of whether standing can be considered prior to class certification in class action lawsuits" but deciding to address standing prior to class certification).

Share this article:

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Email

Recent Posts

(1) Appellate Review of Inherent Power Sanctions (7th Circuit): Factual Findings Reviewed for Clear Error, Choice of Sanction for Abuse of Discretion — 4-Element Test for Reversal; (2) Sanctions and Class Actions: Monetary Sanctions Properly Imposed on Defendants for Improper Communications with Class Members (Represented Parties) — “[I]f The Class And The Class Opponent Are Involved In An Ongoing Business Relationship, Communications From The Class Opponent To The Class May Be Coercive” (Good Quote); (3) Monetary Sanctions under Goodyear v. Haeger: If Same Fact-Gathering Would Have Been Conducted Absent The Misconduct, No But-For Causation — But Only “Rough Justice” Required, “Not Accountant-Like Precision” (Good Quote) — Once Misconduct Is Clear, Time Spent Ferreting It Out Compensable under Goodyear; (4) Goodyear Did Not Overrule Long-Standing Rule That Courts May Impose Modest Civil Monetary Sanctions to Curb Litigation Abuse; (5) Appellate Jurisdiction Lacking Where Sanctioned Attorney Fails to File Notice of Appeal and Lawyer’s Intent to Appeal Not Apparent from Client’s Notice; (5) Rule 11 Improper Purpose — Party May Have Many Purposes for Pursuing Claim — As Long As Claim Is Supported by Good Faith Belief in the Merits, “A Parallel Reason Does Not Violate Rule 11” — To Deny A Motion for Sanctions, The District Court Need Not Address Every Argument: “Arguments Clearly Without Merit Can, And For The Sake Of Judicial Economy Should, Be Passed Over In Silence” (Good Quote); Non-Monetary Sanction on Counsel: Complete Twice The Required Amount Of Professional Responsibility Hours For Her Next Continuing Legal Education Cycle Imposed By The State Bar

Archives