Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

Judicial Notice of Internet Evidence — State Agency Regulations (Hunting Policies) from Agency Website

Safari Club Int’l v. Harris, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1349 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2016):

Plaintiff states in its FAC: "In this lawsuit, Plaintiff . . . challenges the State of California's [statutory] ban on the importation, transportation, and possession in California of mountain lions hunted outside of California" (referred to herein as "Import Ban"). (Pl.'s First Am. Compl. ("FAC") 1:8-11, ECF No. 38.) California voters approved the Import Ban through ballot initiative Proposition 117 in the year 1990; the Import Ban is prescribed in California Fish & Game Code §§ 4800(a), (b)(1). Plaintiff alleges the Import Ban "is unconstitutional under the U.S. Constitution's Commerce Clause (art. I, § 8, cl. 3) and the Equal Protection Clause (amend. XIV)." (Id. at 1:12-13).

***

Plaintiff argues that exhibit J can be found on the California Department of Fish and Wildlife's website and helps demonstrate that California allows "the same hunting methods" used to hunt Mountain Lions that are used to hunt "numerous other species." (Id. 8:2-7.) Plaintiff contends "Exhibit J is the Guide to Hunting Wild Pigs in California, [and that it] states that hunters can use dogs to hunt feral pigs." (Id. 7:24-8:1.)

"It is appropriate to take judicial notice of [the referenced public website] information, [since] it was made publicly available by government [*10]  entities . . . , and neither party disputes the authenticity of the web sites or the accuracy of the information displayed therein." Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2010). Therefore, judicial notice is taken of Plaintiff's Exhibits A to and including J.

Share this article:

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Email

Recent Posts

(1) Appellate Review of Inherent Power Sanctions (7th Circuit): Factual Findings Reviewed for Clear Error, Choice of Sanction for Abuse of Discretion — 4-Element Test for Reversal; (2) Sanctions and Class Actions: Monetary Sanctions Properly Imposed on Defendants for Improper Communications with Class Members (Represented Parties) — “[I]f The Class And The Class Opponent Are Involved In An Ongoing Business Relationship, Communications From The Class Opponent To The Class May Be Coercive” (Good Quote); (3) Monetary Sanctions under Goodyear v. Haeger: If Same Fact-Gathering Would Have Been Conducted Absent The Misconduct, No But-For Causation — But Only “Rough Justice” Required, “Not Accountant-Like Precision” (Good Quote) — Once Misconduct Is Clear, Time Spent Ferreting It Out Compensable under Goodyear; (4) Goodyear Did Not Overrule Long-Standing Rule That Courts May Impose Modest Civil Monetary Sanctions to Curb Litigation Abuse; (5) Appellate Jurisdiction Lacking Where Sanctioned Attorney Fails to File Notice of Appeal and Lawyer’s Intent to Appeal Not Apparent from Client’s Notice; (5) Rule 11 Improper Purpose — Party May Have Many Purposes for Pursuing Claim — As Long As Claim Is Supported by Good Faith Belief in the Merits, “A Parallel Reason Does Not Violate Rule 11” — To Deny A Motion for Sanctions, The District Court Need Not Address Every Argument: “Arguments Clearly Without Merit Can, And For The Sake Of Judicial Economy Should, Be Passed Over In Silence” (Good Quote); Non-Monetary Sanction on Counsel: Complete Twice The Required Amount Of Professional Responsibility Hours For Her Next Continuing Legal Education Cycle Imposed By The State Bar

Archives