(1) Dep't of Educ. v. California, 2025 U.S. LEXIS 1370, at *1-2 (April 4, 2025):

Although the Courts of Appeals generally lack appellate jurisdiction over appeals from TROs, several factors counsel in favor of construing the District Court’s order as an appealable preliminary injunction. Among other considerations, the District Court’s order [*2]  carries many of the hallmarks of a preliminary injunction. See Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 87, 94 S. Ct. 937, 39 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1974); Abbott v. Perez, 585 U. S. 579, 594, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 201 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2018). Moreover, the District Court’s “basis for issuing the order [is] strongly challenged,” as the Government is likely to succeed in showing the District Court lacked jurisdiction to order the payment of money under the APA. Sampson, 415 U. S., at 87, 94 S. Ct. 937, 39 L. Ed. 2d 166. ***

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(2) Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 594 (2018):

The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, “established the general principle that only final decisions of the federal district courts would be reviewable on appeal.” Carson v. American Brands, Inc., 450 U. S. 79, 83, 101 S. Ct. 993, 67 L. Ed. 2d 59 (1981) (emphasis deleted). But because “rigid application of this principle was found to create undue hardship in some cases,” Congress created exceptions. Ibid. Two are relevant here. We have jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. §1253 to hear an appeal from an order of a three-judge district court “granting or denying . . . an interlocutory or permanent injunction.” Similarly, §1292(a)(1) gives the courts of appeals jurisdiction over “[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts” “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions,” “except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”

The orders in these cases fall within §1253. To be sure, the District Court did not call its orders “injunctions”—in fact, it disclaimed the term, App. 134a-136a—but HN6[] the label attached to an order is not dispositive. We have previously made clear that where an order has the “practical effect” of granting or denying an injunction, it should be treated as such for purposes of appellate jurisdiction. Carson, supra, at 83, 101 S. Ct. 993, 67 L. Ed. 2d 59; see also Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U. S. 271, 287-288, 108 S. Ct. 1133, 99 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1988). We applied this test in  [*595]  Carson, holding that an order that declined to enter a consent decree prohibiting certain conduct could be appealed under §1292(a)(1) because it was the practical equivalent of an order denying an injunction and threatened serious and perhaps irreparable harm if not immediately reviewed. 450 U. S., at 83-84, 86-90, 101 S. Ct. 993, 67 L. Ed. 2d 59.

This “practical effect” rule serves a valuable purpose. If an interlocutory injunction is improperly granted or denied, much harm can occur before the final decision in the district court. Lawful and important conduct may be barred, and unlawful and harmful conduct may be allowed to continue. Recognizing this, Congress authorized interlocutory appellate review of such orders. But if the availability of interlocutory  review depended on the district court’s use of the term “injunction” or some other particular language, Congress’s scheme could be frustrated. The harms that Congress wanted to avoid could occur so long as the district court was careful about its terminology. The “practical effect” inquiry prevents such manipulation.

In analogous contexts, we have not allowed district courts to “shield [their] orders from appellate review” by avoiding the label “injunction.” Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 87, 94 S. Ct. 937, 39 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1974). For instance, in Sampson, we held that an order labeled a temporary restraining order (which is not appealable under §1292(a)(1)) should be treated as a “preliminary injunction” (which is appealable) since the order had the same practical effect as a preliminary injunction. Id., at 86-88, 94 S. Ct. 937, 39 L. Ed. 2d 166.

Appellees and the dissent contend that the “practical effect” approach should be confined to §1292(a)(1), but we see no good reason why it should not apply to §1253 as well. Appellees note that we “narrowly constru[e]” §1253, Goldstein v. Cox, 396 U. S. 471, 478, 90 S. Ct. 671, 24 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1970), but we also construe §1292(a)(1) “narrowly,” Carson, supra, at 84, 101 S. Ct. 993, 67 L. Ed. 2d 59. In addition, the relevant language in the two provisions is nearly identical; ¹⁰  [*596]  both provisions serve the same purpose; and we have previously called them “analogous.” Goldstein, supra, at 475, 90 S. Ct. 671, 24 L. Ed. 2d 663.

¹⁰ In relevant part, §1253 applies to “an order granting . . . an interlocutory . . . injunction.” Section 1292(a)(1) applies to “[i]nterlocutory orders . . . granting . . . injunctions.” Although the similarity is obvious, the dissent perceives some unspecified substantive difference.

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

(3) Sampson v. Murray, 415 U. S. 61, 87, 94 S. Ct. 937, 39 L. Ed. 2d 166 (1974)

The Court of Appeals whose judgment we are reviewing has held that a temporary restraining order continued beyond the time permissible under Rule 65 must be treated as a preliminary injunction, and must conform to the standards applicable  [***185]  to preliminary injunctions. National Mediation Board v. Airline Pilots Assn., 116 U. S. App. D. C. 300, 323 F.2d 305 (1963). We believe that this analysis is correct, at least in the type of situation presented here, and comports with general principles imposing strict limitations on the scope of temporary restraining orders.⁵⁸ A district  [*87]  court, if it were able to shield its orders from appellate review merely by designating them as temporary restraining orders, rather than as preliminary injunctions, would have virtually unlimited authority over the parties in an injunctive proceeding.  In this case, where an adversary hearing has been held, and the court's basis for issuing the order strongly challenged, classification of the potentially unlimited order as a temporary restraining order seems particularly unjustified.  Therefore we  [*88]  view the order at issue here as a preliminary injunction.

⁵⁸ The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in an opinion cited by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in National Mediation Board v. Airline Pilots Assn., 116 U. S. App. D. C. 300, 323 F.2d 305 (1963), described these principles as follows:

"It is because the remedy is so drastic and may have such adverse consequences that the authority to issue temporary restraining orders is carefully hedged in Rule 65 (b) by protective provisions.  And the most important of these protective provisions is the limitation on the time during which such an order can continue to be effective.

"It is for the same reason, the possibility of drastic consequences which cannot later be corrected, that an exception is made to the final judgment rule to permit review of preliminary injunctions. 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (a)(1).  To deny review of an order that has all the potential danger of a preliminary injunction in terms of duration, because it is issued without a preliminary adjudication of the basic rights involved, would completely defeat the purpose of this provision.

"We hold, therefore, that the continuation of the temporary restraining order beyond the period of statutory authorization, having, as it does, the same practical effect as the issuance of a preliminary injunction, is appealable within the meaning and intent of 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (a)(1)." Pan American World Airways v. Flight Engineers' Assn., 306 F.2d 840, 843 (1962). (Citations omitted; emphasis in original.)

Our Brother MARSHALL, in his dissenting opinion, nevertheless suggests that a district court can totally or partially impede review of an indefinite injunctive order by failing to make any findings of fact or conclusions of law. It would seem to be a consequence of this reasoning that an order which neglects to comply with one rule may be saved from the normal appellate review by its failure to comply with still another rule.  We do not find this logic convincing.  Admittedly, the District Court did not comply with Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52 (a), but we do not think that we are thereby foreclosed from examining the record to determine if sufficient allegations or sufficient evidence supports the issuance of injunctive relief. As discussed below, nothing in the pleadings or affidavits, or in the testimony at the hearing before the District Court, demonstrates that this is an extraordinary case supporting the award of judicial relief.  See n. 68, infra.