Mula v. Mula, 2025 WL 869208 (9th Cir. Mar. 20, 2025) (unpublished):

MEMORANDUM^*

*1 Plaintiff-Appellant Paul Mula Jr. (“Mula”) appeals the district court’s dismissal of his action against remaining Defendant-Appellees Alan Mula, Terry Wallace Campbell, Kristofer Biorn (“Biorn”), and the law firm Crist, Schulz, Biorn & Sheperd APC.¹ In Count 1 of his Corrected Second Amended Complaint (“CSAC”), Mula alleges that Defendant-Appellees entered two Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., conspiracies—an original conspiracy and a cover-up conspiracy—to deprive him of assets allegedly left in trust to him by his deceased grandmother. Counts 2–7 of the CSAC allege various state law violations.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1964(a). We review de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). L.A. Lakers, Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 869 F.3d 795, 800 (9th Cir. 2017). We review for abuse of discretion both a district court’s decision to dismiss a complaint with prejudice, Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1141–42 (9th Cir. 2021), and decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction, Trustees of Construction Ind. and Laborers Health and Welfare Trust v. Desert Valley Landscape & Maintenance, Inc., 333 F.3d 923, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). We affirm.

The district court did not err in concluding that Mula’s RICO claim pertaining to the original conspiracy is barred by the statute of limitations. And although not addressed by the district court, we find that Mula’s cover-up RICO claim is similarly time-barred. The statute of limitations for civil RICO actions is four years. Pincay v. Andrews, 238 F.3d 1106, 1108 (9th Cir. 2001). We follow the “injury discovery” rule, meaning the statute of limitations period “begins to run when a plaintiff knows or should know of the injury that underlies his cause of action.” Grimmett v. Brown, 75 F.3d 506, 510–11 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal citations omitted).

Mula alleges that two primary injuries form the basis of his RICO cause of action: first, the transfer of four pieces of real property out of the trust by grant deeds, and second, past legal expenses incurred in defending his interest in the trust. Though Mula first learned of the 2005 real property transfer in 2012, he argues he did not discover the 2006 Petition to Confirm Title to the real property—“a new and independent act” that actually caused his injury—until 2019. We disagree. The clock begins when appellant should have discovered the alleged injury, see Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000), and Mula’s knowledge of the 2005 grant deeds was sufficient to put him on inquiry notice of the injury underlying his cause of action. And while Mula argues that past legal expenses may constitute a cognizable injury under civil RICO—an issue this Court has yet to address—the only legal expense Mula alleges in his CSAC is a $5,000 payment to Defendant-Appellee Biorn in 2012.

*2 Mula’s subsequent discovery of Defendant-Appellees’ “widespread looting” of trust property does not constitute a “new and independent” act such that Mula experienced a “new” injury. See Grimmett, 75 F.3d at 514 (finding that acts part of the same corporate scheme are not “new and independent”). Moreover, because the CSAC fails to allege any non-conclusory allegations that Defendant-Appellees actively mislead him, Mula cannot rely on the doctrine of fraudulent concealment. See id. (“[t]he doctrine of fraudulent concealment is invoked only if the plaintiff pleads and proves that the defendant actively mislead her ...”) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).

Accordingly, because Mula knew of the facts underlying his RICO claims in 2012, the statute of limitations had expired on both conspiracies pled in Count I when he filed his original complaint in 2021. Pincay, 238 F.3d at 1109.

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Mula’s case with prejudice. Leave to amend must be granted unless one or more of the following factors is present: (1) undue delay; (2) bad faith or dilatory motive; (3) repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment; (4) undue prejudice to the opposing party; and (5) futility of amendment. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). The district court adequately explained that its decision rested on Mula’s failure to cure the deficiencies in his RICO claim despite guidance from the court.

 Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mula’s state-law claims. The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the case was still at the pleading stage. This is not an abuse of discretion. See Sanford v. MemberWorks, Inc., 625 F.3d 550, 561 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]n the usual case in which all federal law-claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.”) (citation and internal quotations omitted).

AFFIRMED.²