Kendrick v. Amazon.Com Servs., LLC, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 27411 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 2024) (unpublished):

ORDER

Rome Kendrick, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals the district court's dismissal of his employment-discrimination case against his former employer, Amazon.com Services, LLC (Amazon), for violations of discovery rules and court orders, pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 37 and 41. This case has been referred to a panel of the court that, upon examination, unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a). For the following reasons, we affirm.

In November 2021, Kendrick sued Amazon under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e—2000e-17, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C §§ 12112-12117. He alleged that Amazon retaliated against him and discriminated against him on the basis of race and disability when it terminated his employment after a workplace accident that injured his eye. The district court dismissed his Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims for failure to exhaust [*2]  his administrative remedies but allowed the ADA claim to proceed.

In the meantime, the parties engaged in discovery. In April 2023, Amazon moved to compel Kendrick to respond to three interrogatories and to produce requested documents. Amazon explained that Kendrick provided incomplete responses to its interrogatories about his employment history, attempts to seek subsequent employment, and criminal history. With respect to its request for production, Amazon explained that Kendrick refused to produce documentation related to his income and that the documents Kendrick did produce were merely photos of documents taken with his phone that were "unorganized, illegible, blurry, and unlabeled."

Shortly thereafter, Kendrick filed a second response to Amazon's interrogatories and request for production of documents. A magistrate judge held a hearing on the motion to compel, which Kendrick did not attend. The magistrate judge granted Amazon's motion and ordered Kendrick to produce all documents responsive to Amazon's request for production and to supplement his responses to two interrogatories within 14 days. The magistrate judge's order warned Kendrick that "failure to comply with this order [*3] may result in sanctions as set forth in [Rule 37(b)(2)(A)], up to and including the dismissal of his lawsuit."

Kendrick notified the district court that he timely submitted his supplemental responses and documents to Amazon. Amazon responded that Kendrick did not comply with the court's order and "produced only partial documentation." It identified several specific documents that Kendrick initially attempted to produce but were illegible and explained that Kendrick did not produce legible and complete versions of these documents as ordered by the magistrate judge. Amazon moved for sanctions, including dismissal, under Rule 37(b)(2)(A), or, alternatively, for dismissal for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b), asserting that Kendrick's three attempts to respond to its interrogatories and requests for production were "wholly inadequate" and that he had repeatedly failed to respond when defense counsel contacted him about the deficient responses. Amazon also noted that Kendrick failed to respond to repeated requests for dates that he would be available for a deposition.

After a hearing, the magistrate judge recommended that Amazon's motion be granted and that Kendrick's complaint be dismissed with prejudice. Kendrick objected [*4]  and the district court held its ruling on Amazon's motion in abeyance to give Kendrick one final chance to comply with his discovery obligations. The court ordered Kendrick to provide all requested discovery to Amazon within three weeks and to immediately advise Amazon's counsel of his availability for a deposition. The court warned that, if Kendrick failed to comply with its order or failed to make himself available for a deposition, it would adopt the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in its entirety and dismiss the complaint with prejudice.

After three weeks, Amazon notified the district court that Kendrick still did not comply with the court's discovery orders. According to Amazon, although Kendrick turned over more than 200 pages of documentation, he failed to produce several documents that he had previously produced but were deemed illegible, incomplete, or improper by the magistrate judge. He also did not produce the specific documents identified in Amazon's previous deficiency notice. Kendrick responded that he had "done a full dive into all his tangible files and . . . furnished the files and given them to [Amazon]."

The district court reviewed Kendrick's newly produced [*5]  documents and found that his "discovery obligations remain[ed] unfulfilled." The court explained that Kendrick produced "several of the same illegible documents" that he had produced previously and that his new documents "var[ied] significantly in several respects from the documents that he had previously produced and that the [c]ourt ha[d] ordered him to produce multiple times." The court also noted that Kendrick's most recent production "entirely omit[ted] documents that he previously produced in either incomplete or unreadable formats despite being ordered to remedy these deficiencies." The court therefore adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation that Amazon's motion for sanctions be granted and dismissed Kendrick's complaint with prejudice.

On appeal, Kendrick insists that he turned over to Amazon all the documents that he had in his possession or that were "retrievable" by him and argues that his case should have been heard on the merits.

"The decision to dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with a discovery obligation or other court order is reviewed for abuse of discretion." Mager v. Wis. Cent. Ltd., 924 F.3d 831, 837 (6th Cir. 2019). "An abuse of discretion exists when the reviewing court is firmly convinced that a mistake [*6]  has been made." Stough v. Mayville Cmty. Schs., 138 F.3d 612, 614 (6th Cir. 1998).

Rule 37(b) authorizes the district court to order sanctions, including dismissal, for failure to comply with a discovery order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v). Rule 41(b) permits dismissal on a defendant's motion "[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court order." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). In determining whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction for failure to comply with a discovery obligation or court order, this court considers four factors:

(1) whether the party's failure is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault; (2) whether the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed party's conduct; (3) whether the dismissed party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to dismissal; and (4) whether less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before dismissal was ordered.

Mager, 924 F.3d at 837 (quoting United States v. Reyes, 307 F.3d 451, 458 (6th Cir. 2002)). "Although no one factor is dispositive, dismissal is proper if the record demonstrates delay or contumacious conduct." Reyes, 307 F.3d at 458. A review of these factors leads us to conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Kendrick's case.

The first factor—willfulness, bad faith, or fault—is satisfied when the plaintiffs conduct "display[s] either an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or a reckless disregard [*7]  for the effect of [his] conduct on those proceedings." Mulbah v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 261 F.3d 586, 591 (6th Cir. 2001) (second alteration in original) (quoting Shepard Claims Serv. v. William Darrah & Assocs., 796 F.2d 190, 194 (6th Cir. 1986)). Despite the magistrate and district judges' warnings of the consequences of failing to respond to Amazon's discovery requests and having been given multiple opportunities to do so, Kendrick continued to provide inadequate and incomplete responses to Amazon's request to produce documents. In response to Amazon's motion for sanctions, Kendrick asserted that Amazon's requests were "redundant" and that the documents were "in their possession already." But Amazon and the court repeatedly explained to Kendrick that the documents he turned over were illegible and incomplete. As the district court found, although Kendrick may not have acted willfully or in bad faith, his "repeated delays demonstrate [d] a reckless disregard for the effect that his conduct . . . had on these proceedings." This factor supports the district court's decision to dismiss Kendrick's complaint.

"The key to finding prejudice . . . is whether the defendants 'waste[d] time, money, and effort in pursuit of cooperation which [the plaintiff] was legally obligated to provide.'" Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dep't, 529 F.3d 731, 739 (6th Cir. 2008) (alterations in original) (quoting Harmon v. CSX Transp., Inc., 110 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 1997)). Kendrick's [*8]  repeated noncompliance forced Amazon to move to compel and for sanctions. This factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

With respect to the third factor, there is no dispute that the magistrate judge and the district court explicitly warned Kendrick that failure to comply with Amazon's discovery requests and the court's orders could result in sanctions, including dismissal of his case.

Lastly, the district court did not impose lesser sanctions on Kendrick before dismissing the case. But this court has "never held that a district court is without power to dismiss a complaint, as the first and only sanction." Harmon, 110 F.3d at 368. And the record reflects that the district court considered less drastic sanctions but concluded that lesser sanctions would not have any effect on Kendrick's conduct, given his "failures to participate in the prosecution of his case." Noting Kendrick's failure to attend hearings and his repeated failures to provide Amazon with the documents and information necessary to the case, the court found that "the integrity of the pretrial process would not be protected by any alternative sanction." The district court properly concluded that this factor, along with the other three factors, weighed [*9]  in favor of dismissal.

For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment.