Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

RICO Causation: Parents of Children with Disabilities Deprived In-Person Education and Services during the Pandemic Were Not Causally Injured by Teachers’ False Assurances to Federal Authorities That IDEA-Complaint Policies Were in Place, Which Caused Funds to Issue But Not to the Benefit of the Disabled Children — Damages Too Indirect — Proper Plaintiff Is U.S. Government — Private Injunctive Relief Under RICO Uncertain in Third Circuit

Carmona v. N.J. Dep't of Educ., 2023 WL 5814677 (3d Cir. Sept. 8, 2023) (unpublished):

OPINION*

Plaintiff-Appellants are parents of children with disabilities in New Jersey who sued Defendant-Appellees—the New Jersey Department of Education (“NJDOE”), the NJDOE Commissioner, their children’s school districts, and superintendents of those districts (collectively, the “Educators”)—in a putative class action challenging the suspension of in-person education and services during the COVID-19 pandemic under, inter alia, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). The District Court dismissed all claims because the IDEA and IDEA-related claims (Counts One through Eight) were unexhausted, and the RICO allegations (Count Nine) did not establish standing and were otherwise inadequate. We will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the Plaintiff-Appellants’ Amended Complaint for failure to exhaust Counts One through Eight and for lack of standing to bring Count Nine.

  1. BACKGROUND1

In March 2020, all New Jersey schools were closed by gubernatorial executive order due to the COVID-19 pandemic. A973–74. Schools continued to educate students “through appropriate home instruction,” id., and remained closed for the rest of the 2019–20 school year. They gradually reopened over the 2020–21 school year, starting with a hybrid of distance and in-person learning and transitioning to full-time in-person instruction. Exec. Order No. 175 (Aug. 13, 2020); A1023, Exec. Order No. 214 (Jan. 11, 2021); A979. During this time, the United States Department of Education (“USDOE”) provided guidance on how schools might fulfill their obligations to students with disabilities and informed schools that “ensuring compliance with the [IDEA], Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ..., and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act should not prevent any school from offering educational programs through distance instruction.” A955.

In October 2021, the Plaintiff-Appellants (hereinafter, the “Parents”) challenged the switch to distance learning in the 2019–20 and 2020–21 school years for their children with disabilities by filing suit against the Educators in the District Court.2 The Parents filed suit for themselves and on behalf of a putative class of “all other similarly situated school-aged children with disabilities covered by IDEA in New Jersey and their parents.” A257.3

The Parents amended their complaint and articulated eight causes of action based in federal and state law all related to alleged deprivations of adequate education in violation of the IDEA. In support of these claims, the Parents generally alleged that their children’s Individualized Education Plans (“IEP”) had been unilaterally altered by the shift to distance learning and deprived them of the right to a free and appropriate public education (“FAPE”) under the IDEA. The Parents contended this was a change of educational placement requiring prior written notice. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3). At the time their suit was filed, the Parents had “initiated, but ... not exhausted, their administrative remedies.” A203.

Count Nine of the Amended Complaint, civil RICO, alleged that individual Educator defendants had engaged in a scheme wherein they falsely represented their IDEA compliance during the pandemic to continue to obtain federal IDEA funding. A275, 277–306. The false statements allegedly caused the federal government to wrongfully remit IDEA Part B funds to the NJDOE and defendant school districts.4 This, in turn, allegedly deprived Plaintiffs of the benefit of Part B funds apparently because said funds were diverted from benefiting students with disabilities and used for other purposes such as the purchase of personal protective equipment. A304.

The Educators moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint and the District Court granted their motion. The District Court concluded that, in Counts One through Eight, the Parents were required to exhaust administrative remedies because they sought “relief available under the IDEA.” A13. The District Court further concluded that the Parents had not exhausted their remedies, nor shown an exception applied. These counts were thus dismissed for want of subject matter jurisdiction. The District Court also dismissed the Parents’ RICO count because, among other infirmities, the Parents “allege[d] only indirect harm flowing from the allegedly fraudulent scheme” and therefore lacked standing. A15. The Parents chose to stand on their Amended Complaint rather than amending it again. The District Court then issued its final order and the Parents timely appealed.5

  1. DISCUSSION6

Our review of the District Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) is de novo, as is our review of dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 632 (3d Cir. 2017); Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008). The District Court determined, and the parties do not dispute, that the Educators’ subject matter jurisdiction challenge to the first eight counts was a facial attack. A5. A facial attack “challenges subject matter jurisdiction without disputing the facts alleged in the complaint, and it requires the Court to ‘consider the allegations of the complaint as true.’ ” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006)). In reviewing the dismissal of the RICO count for failure to state a claim, we likewise “accept [the Parents’] well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences from those allegations in [their] favor.” In re Horizon, 846 F.3d at 633.

***

  1. The RICO Count

The Parents also challenge the District Court’s dismissal of Count Nine, which alleged that the individual Educators violated RICO (18 U.S.C. §§ 19611968). Specifically, the Parents alleged the Educators were involved “in a scheme to deprive Plaintiffs of IDEA Part B funds by making false representations to the USDOE about their compliance with the IDEA during the COVID-19 pandemic.” A13. The District Court determined that these allegations failed because, among other things, the Parents lacked standing as “the alleged fraud was perpetrated on the United States government, not [the Parents].” A15–17.12 We agree with the District Court’s decision regarding the Parents’ lack of standing and will affirm on that basis. Accordingly, we need not reach the other reasons cited by the District Court.

RICO prohibits a person, who is part of an enterprise that affects interstate commerce, from participating in the enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Genty v. Resol. Tr. Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 906 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)). Such activity includes the commission of mail fraud and wire fraud. Care One Mgmt. LLC v. United Healthcare Workers E., 43 F.4th 126, 135 (3d Cir. 2022). RICO has both criminal and civil provisions and civil RICO suits may be “brought by any person injured ‘in his business or property’ by a RICO violation.” Genty, 937 F.2d at 906 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)). To establish standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the alleged RICO violation is both a but for and proximate cause of her injury. Anderson v. Ayling, 396 F.3d 265, 269 (3d Cir. 2005). RICO does not permit suit where “the violation is ... too remote from the injury.” Allegheny Gen. Hosp. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 228 F.3d 429, 443 (3d Cir. 2000); see also St. Luke’s Health Network, Inc. v. Lancaster Gen. Hosp., 967 F.3d 295, 300 (3d Cir. 2020) (“[P]roximate causation is employed in civil RICO ... to stymie a flood of litigation, reserving recovery for those who have been directly affected by a defendant’s wrongdoing.”).

The Parents failed to plausibly allege injuries proximately caused by the purported RICO violations. In their Amended Complaint, the Parents alleged the individual Educators falsely assured the USDOE and NJDOE that the entity defendants (NJDOE and school districts) had IDEA-compliant policies and procedures in place from January to July 2019 and January to July 2020. The Parents alleged that these misrepresentations caused Part B funds to be unlawfully remitted in violation of the mail and wire fraud statutes. The Parents further alleged that they—as the intended beneficiaries of Part B funds—were resultantly defrauded of hundreds of millions of dollars in funding and suffered other harm “including significant regressions in skills and loss of competencies.” A275, 306–07.

We agree with the District Court that these injuries are too remote to establish the Parents’ standing. To the extent the purported misrepresentations caused the fraudulent remittance of Part B funds, the direct victim of said fraud would be the United States government. J.T., 500 F. Supp. 3d at 166. The Parents’ attempt to cast themselves as indirect victims is insufficient to establish standing, as the government would have the better claim for relief. St. Luke’s, 967 F.3d at 301 (“[A] more direct victim ... may also break the chain of causation.”); Simpson-Vlach v. Mich. Dep’t of Educ., No. 22-1724, 2023 WL 3347497, at *7 (6th Cir. May 10, 2023) (explaining in a similar case that plaintiffs’ injuries were “passed-on” where the “false assurances were made to the [USDOE] ... meaning that the federal government was the direct victim”). The Parents’ alleged injuries from harms like skills regression are too remote and indirect to confer standing as the Parents failed to allege any connection between the claimed misrepresentations and these harms. Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that the Parents failed to establish standing to pursue Count Nine, for violations of RICO.13

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s order entered September 12, 2022, dismissing the Parents’ Amended Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim.

 

Footnotes
*

 

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to 3d Cir. I.O.P. 5.7, does not constitute binding precedent.
1

 

Because we write for the parties, we recite only facts pertinent to our decision.
2

 

Some Appellees (the NJDOE, Angelica Allen-McMillan, Ave Altersitz, Judith DeStefano-Anen, Roger Jinks, Charles Muller, Lovell Pugh-Bassett, Lester W. Richens, and Joseph S. Zarra) did not file a brief on appeal, and they have explained their lack of participation in this appeal by letter to the Court indicating they were not properly served before the District Court. Letter, Carmona et al. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Educ. et al., No. 22-2874 (3d Cir. Dec. 1, 2022), ECF No. 26.
3

 

They also moved for a preliminary injunction declaring “in-person instruction and services” to be the class’s “status quo pendency placement” and enjoining the Educators from “unilaterally changing [their] placement,” for more than ten days at a time, among other things. A56–57. The District Court denied the Parents’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
4

 

Part B funds are the federal monies promised to States that ensure students receive a FAPE. 20 U.S.C. § 1412.
5

 

Dorene Camp, individually and as Parent and Natural Guardian of S.C./C.C./T.C., was withdrawn from this matter by this Court’s Order on December 20, 2022. ORDER, Carmona et al. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Educ. et al., No. 22-2874 (3d Cir. Dec. 20, 2022), ECF No. 31. Lisa Mattessich, individually, and as Parent and Natural Guardian of M.M., sought to voluntarily withdraw from this matter on February 17, 2023, and the Court granted her withdrawal on September 6, 2023. ORDER, Carmona et al. v. New Jersey Dep’t of Educ. et al., No. 22-2874 (3d Cir. Sept. 6, 2023), ECF No. 97.
6

 

We have appellate jurisdiction to review the District Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Batchelor v. Rose Tree Media Sch. Dist., 759 F.3d 266, 271 (3d Cir. 2014). The District Court had jurisdiction over the Parents’ RICO claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and Section 1291 provides our appellate jurisdiction. Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 481 (3d Cir. 2000).
7

 

In Perez, the Supreme Court held that exhaustion is not required when a plaintiff seeks “a form of relief ... [the] IDEA does not provide.” 143 S. Ct. at 864. Courts have determined that IDEA’s remedies include “prospective injunctive relief” and “retroactive reimbursement.” Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 370 (1985). Relief that is unavailable under the IDEA includes “compensatory and punitive damages.” Chambers ex rel. Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd of Educ., 587 F.3d 176, 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (explaining the IDEA is not meant to compensate for “pain and suffering where a FAPE is not provided.”). When asked to address Perez, the Parents asserted that Perez is inapplicable to their case. Parents’ Supp. Br. at 7. Our own review of the Amended Complaint confirms that the Parents did not seek compensatory damages; rather, the Parents only requested remedies provided by the IDEA. A307–08. While the Parents made cursory references to damages, we find these cursory references insufficient to constitute a claim for damages. See Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232–33 (rejecting “blanket assertion[s] of ... entitlement to relief”).
8

 

In the Amended Complaint, the Parents each alleged that they had initiated individual administrative cases. A223–56. On appeal, the Parents describe the updated status of those cases: some had settled, others had completed administrative proceedings, and one appellant’s case was yet unresolved. Parents’ Opening Br. at 15–17.
9

 

On appeal, the Parents have not fully developed a systemic exception to exhaustion argument, but we address the systemic exception herein out of an abundance of caution where the Parents’ exception-to-exhaustion argument is interspersed with references to the Educators’ alleged systemic failures with respect to providing FAPEs to the Parents’ children and similarly situated children in New Jersey.
10

 

The Ninth Circuit gave one example of a change of placement that, out of context, would seem to support the Parents’ argument. Explaining a change in educational programming as a change in placement, the Ninth Circuit gave the example of moving “from one type of program—i.e., regular class—to another type—i.e., home instruction.” Id. at 1116. But critically, that example was followed by guidance that these decisions were to be “made in light of Congress’s intent to prevent the singling out of disabled children and to ‘mainstream’ them with non-disabled children.” Id. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s example does not indicate a change of placement occurs when an entire school system moves to home instruction for reasons totally unrelated to any student’s disability.
11

 

As discussed supra, Section II.A. and footnote 7, although Counts Two through Eight were not IDEA claims, they are also subject to the exhaustion requirement because the Parents sought IDEA remedies and these claims concerned the denial of a FAPE; accordingly, they must be dismissed for the reasons set forth herein. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l); Perez, 143 S. Ct. at 864–65; T.R., 4 F.4th at 195.
12

 

The District Court also questioned whether RICO establishes a private right of equitable relief, though it ultimately assumed as much for purposes of evaluating the Parents’ RICO claim. Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has decided that question. RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. Eur. Cmty., 579 U.S. 325, 354 n.13 (2016). We need not address this question to resolve the Parents’ appeal.
13

 

Even if the Parents had shown standing, we would affirm the District Court’s dismissal based on the Parents’ failure to plausibly allege predicate acts. The Parents alleged violations of “federal mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and 18 U.S.C. § 1343.” A278–79. Allegations of mail or wire fraud as the bases for a RICO violation must be “pled with specificity.” Lum v. Bank of Am., 361 F.3d 217, 223 (3d Cir. 2004), abrogated in part on other grounds by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). The Parents’ allegations fail for at least two reasons. First, the Parents’ claim that the Educators made misrepresentations in 2019, before the pandemic began in 2020. But the Amended Complaint does not allege that the Educators sought or received IDEA Part B funds in 2019 with any idea that they would close schools due to a pandemic. See J.T., 500 F. Supp. 3d at 170. Second, the Parents’ allegations that the Educators misrepresented IDEA compliance in 2020 are not only vague but also untenable in light of the fact that the Educators relied on USDOE’s own guidance that a FAPE could be provided through distance learning. See Roe v. Baker, 624 F. Supp. 3d 52, 62 (D. Mass. 2022), aff’d, Roe v. Healey, — F.4th —, 2023 WL 5199870 (1st Cir. Aug. 14, 2023).

 

 

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