Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

Arbitration — Is Manifest Disregard a Permissible Ground to Overturn an Award under the FAA? — Circuit Split — If So, It Requires More Than Legal Error — Arbitrator Must Appreciate & Ignore Clearly Governing Legal Principle

Global Liquidity Partners, LLC v. Wegher, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165427 (D.N.J. Nov. 30, 2016):

C. Manifest Disregard of the Law under 10(a)(4)

Respondents bring their manifest disregard for the law assertion under 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4). Courts vary in their interpretation of the standard. See Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 585 (2008) ("Maybe the term 'manifest disregard' [means] to name a new ground for review, but maybe it merely refer[s] to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to them. . . . Or, as some courts have thought, 'manifest disregard' may have been shorthand for §10(a)(3) or § 10(a)(4)."). The Third Circuit has declined to determine whether the manifest disregard for the law standard has survived the Supreme Court's decision in Hall Street Associates. See Whitehead v. Pullman Grp., LLC, 811 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2016) ("Whether [the manifest disregard of the law] standard survived the Supreme Court's conclusion in Mattel . . . is an open question. A circuit split has since developed, and this Court has not yet weighed-in. We decline the opportunity to do so now."). Assuming the standard persists, it "requires more than legal error. [Instead], the arbitrator's [*14]  decision 'must fly in the face of clearly established legal precedent,' such as where an arbitrator 'appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to it.'" Id. at 121 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986)).

Share this article:

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Email

Recent Posts

(1) Appellate Review of Inherent Power Sanctions (7th Circuit): Factual Findings Reviewed for Clear Error, Choice of Sanction for Abuse of Discretion — 4-Element Test for Reversal; (2) Sanctions and Class Actions: Monetary Sanctions Properly Imposed on Defendants for Improper Communications with Class Members (Represented Parties) — “[I]f The Class And The Class Opponent Are Involved In An Ongoing Business Relationship, Communications From The Class Opponent To The Class May Be Coercive” (Good Quote); (3) Monetary Sanctions under Goodyear v. Haeger: If Same Fact-Gathering Would Have Been Conducted Absent The Misconduct, No But-For Causation — But Only “Rough Justice” Required, “Not Accountant-Like Precision” (Good Quote) — Once Misconduct Is Clear, Time Spent Ferreting It Out Compensable under Goodyear; (4) Goodyear Did Not Overrule Long-Standing Rule That Courts May Impose Modest Civil Monetary Sanctions to Curb Litigation Abuse; (5) Appellate Jurisdiction Lacking Where Sanctioned Attorney Fails to File Notice of Appeal and Lawyer’s Intent to Appeal Not Apparent from Client’s Notice; (5) Rule 11 Improper Purpose — Party May Have Many Purposes for Pursuing Claim — As Long As Claim Is Supported by Good Faith Belief in the Merits, “A Parallel Reason Does Not Violate Rule 11” — To Deny A Motion for Sanctions, The District Court Need Not Address Every Argument: “Arguments Clearly Without Merit Can, And For The Sake Of Judicial Economy Should, Be Passed Over In Silence” (Good Quote); Non-Monetary Sanction on Counsel: Complete Twice The Required Amount Of Professional Responsibility Hours For Her Next Continuing Legal Education Cycle Imposed By The State Bar

Archives