RICO: Indian Tribes Are Governmental Entities Not Subject to RICO Liability — They Are “Persons” But Immune — They Have the Mens Rea of Their Officials — Injunctive Relief Is Available in Private RICO Actions

Gingras v. Rosette, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66833 (D. Vt. May 18, 2016);

Plaintiffs have filed a class action against individuals and companies involved in an online lending venture operated by the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Indian Reservation in Montana (the Tribe). They claim that the "payday" loans offered by Plain Green, LLC violate federal and state law because of the usurious interest rates (between 198 and [*3]  376% annually) and other unlawful features of the loans such as the lender's automatic access to the consumer's bank account to facilitate repayment.

All Defendants have filed motions to dismiss or to compel arbitration. (Docs. 64, 65, 66, 67, 76, 77.) Also pending is Plaintiffs' Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery on the issues of subject-matter jurisdiction and arbitration. (Doc. 43.) The court heard argument on all of the pending motions on December 16, 2015. Plaintiffs filed Supplemental Authority and Supplemental Documents on January 18, 2016 (Doc. 107) and April 8, 2016 (Doc. 114), at which time the court took the motions under advisement.

Background

The facts as they appear in Plaintiffs 43-page First Amended Complaint ("FAC") (Doc. 18) may be summarized as follows.1

1   Additional factual allegations are recited as necessary in the discussion below.

Plaintiffs are Vermont residents who have borrowed money from Plain Green, LLC. Plain Green holds itself out as a "tribal lending entity wholly owned by the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky Boy's Indian Reservation." (Doc. 18 ¶ 2.) The reservation is located in Montana.

Plain Green operates its lending business over the internet. It has no [*4]  physical place of business in Vermont or any property or employees in Vermont. Instead, borrowers reply to an internet site and apply for credit through an online application process. (Id. ¶ 21.) Within the banking industry, these loans are commonly called "payday loans" because they are frequently marketed as loans sufficient to tide the borrower over until the next paycheck. Plain Green employs subsidiaries of Think Finance, Inc. to market, administer, and collect its loans. (Id. ¶ 57.)

Plaintiffs borrowed relatively small sums of money from Plain Green for periods of up to one year. Frequently one loan would follow close on the heels of the repayment of the previous loan.

In July 2011, Plaintiff Jessica Gingras borrowed $1,050 from Plain Green at a rate of 198.17%. She repaid this loan with interest. During July and August 2012, she borrowed a total of $2,900 at a rate of 371.82%. She has not repaid the second loan. (Id. ¶¶ 48-50.)2

2   In addition to loans taken out from Plain Green, Jessica Gingras borrowed $1,200 from FBDLoans in March 2000. This loan was transferred to ThinkCash (a company operated by Kenneth Rees) and later transferred to Plain Green. (Id. ¶ 47.)

Plaintiff Angela Given [*5]  borrowed $1,250 from Plain Green in July 2011. She completed repayment a year later. The annual interest rate was 198.45%. (Id. ¶ 60.) Within a few days, in July 2012, she borrowed $2,000. She completed repayment a year later in July 2013 at an annual interest rate of 159.46%. (Id. ¶ 61.) She also borrowed $250 in May 2013 which she repaid within a few weeks at an annual interest rate of 376.13%. In July 2013, she borrowed $3,000 at 59.83%. She has not completed repayment of the most recent loan.

Plaintiffs allege that the high interest rates violate Vermont's usury laws which permit a maximum rate of interest of 24%. See 9 V.S.A. § 41a. The loan agreements contain other provisions which Plaintiffs say violate state and federal law, including the provision for automatic access to the borrower's bank account in violation of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1693k(1). (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 181-195.)

Plaintiffs have not sued Plain Green. Instead, they have sued Joel Rosette, who is the Chief Executive Officer of Plain Green, and Ted Whitford and Tim McInerney (the "Tribal Defendants"), who are members of Plain Green's Board of Directors. All three are sued in their official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief only pursuant [*6]  to the authority expressed in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

Plaintiffs have also sued Think Finance, Inc. ("Think Finance" or "TF") and its former President, Chief Executive Officer, and Chairman of the Board Kenneth Rees. Think Finance is a Delaware corporation. Kenneth Rees is a citizen of Texas. The FAC alleges that these defendants developed a plan to make loans through a tribal entity in order to take advantage of tribal immunity from state banking laws. (Doc. 18 ¶ 80.) They control the operations of Plain Green. They dictated the terms of the Tribe's finance code. In Plaintiffs' view, Plain Green is a shell company created by Think Finance and Mr. Rees in order to provide a layer of legal protection for a lending business which the Federal Trade Commission and state banking regulators have determined to be illegal. (See id. ¶ 3; see also id. ¶ 37 ("Plain Green's very existence is an effort to avoid liability.").) Plaintiffs allege that the tribal law relevant to this lending business and the tribal courts with potential jurisdiction over any dispute have been subverted by the money generated by Plain Green.

The next group of defendants are subsidiaries of Think Finance which perform various tasks in connection [*7]  with the payday lending operation. These include TC Decision Sciences, LLC, Tailwind Marketing, LLC, and TC Loan Service, LLC. (These defendants, together with Think Finance, Inc., are referred to as the "Think Defendants.")

Finally, Plaintiffs have sued two of the financial institutions which they claim provide the funding for loans made by Plain Green. These are Sequoia Capital Operations, LLC (Sequoia) and Technology Crossover Ventures (TCV).3

3   At the December 16, 2015 hearing, counsel for TCV remarked that "Technology Crossover Ventures" does not exist, and that Plaintiffs presumably intended to name "TCV V" as a defendant. The court treats TCV V as the defendant in question, and refers to it as "TCV." Counsel for Sequoia Capital Operations, LLC remarked that that entity is an operations organization that makes no investments, and that Plaintiffs presumably intended to name Sequoia Capital. The court treats Sequoia Capital as the defendant in question, and refers to it as "Sequoia."

Both of the loan agreements between Plain Green and Plaintiffs contain arbitration clauses. The clauses are detailed and cover several pages of the parties' loan agreements.4 The arbitration provisions require [*8]  the borrowers to submit any dispute to binding arbitration, including disputes with "related third parties." (Doc. 13-5 at 50.) The borrower may opt out of the arbitration provision within 60 days of the receipt of loan funds. (Id. at 49.) The borrower may select the procedures of the American Arbitration Association or JAMS and the arbitration may occur on the reservation or within 30 miles of the borrower's residence at the choice of the borrower. Plain Green will bear the cost of the arbitration including the filing fee and the arbitrator's costs. Each side pays its own attorneys fees. The arbitrator may award attorneys fees to the prevailing party.

4   The FAC incorporates the agreements by reference. (See Doc. 18 ¶ 118.)

The arbitrator is required to apply Chippewa Cree tribal law to the dispute. He or she is not authorized to hear class-wide claims. He or she must refer any dispute over class arbitration to a tribal court of the Chippewa Cree Tribe. The arbitrator must make written findings to support an award. Any award must be supported by substantial evidence and must be consistent with the loan agreement. The tribal court has authority to aside an award if these conditions are not met. [*9]  The arbitration agreement and the loan agreement as a whole are subject to tribal law and are not subject to the laws of any state.

Analysis

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F. Civil RICO Claims (Counts Five and Six)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants are liable under the federal RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., because they took part in "collection of unlawful debt" as well as "racketeering" activities. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) ("It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.").27 "The requirements of section 1962(c) must be established as to each individual defendant." DeFalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 306 (2d Cir. 2001). There [*81]  are multiple elements required to state a RICO claim; and Defendants raise challenges related to almost every element.28

27   Plaintiffs' two RICO counts both appear to be claims under § 1962(c): one claim premised on an alleged pattern of racketeering activity (Count Five), and one claim premised on alleged collection of unlawful debt (Count Six). Plaintiffs assert (Doc. 85 at 108) that the FAC alleges a RICO conspiracy under § 1962(d), but also concede that the FAC does not contain a count alleging such a conspiracy. The court accordingly limits its analysis to § 1962(c).

28   Some elements--for example, that Plain Green is an "enterprise" or that it is engaged in or affects interstate commerce--are not challenged by any Defendant. The discussion that follows is organized according to the elements that are contested, with analysis of each individual Defendant's argument on each of those elements.

1. Equitable Relief is Available in Private RICO Actions

As against the Tribal Defendants, Plaintiffs seek only equitable relief for the alleged RICO violations. (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 207, 215.) The Tribal Defendants argue that RICO's civil remedies provision, 18 U.S.C. § 1964, authorizes recovery for money damages only--not equitable relief. (Doc. 66 at 21.) [*82]  It is true that 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) authorizes recovery of damages without mentioning injunctive relief. But the court disagrees with the Tribal Defendants' narrow reading of the relief available in private RICO actions.

The Tribal Defendants concede that the Second Circuit has not expressly decided whether equitable relief is available in private RICO actions. (Doc. 66 at 21.)29 Other circuits have reached differing conclusions on the issue.30 District courts within the Second Circuit are also divided.31 For largely the reasons stated by Judge Kaplan in Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), this court concludes that equitable relief is available in private RICO actions. The court must read the subsections of § 1964 together, and that reading reveals that subsections (b) and (c) "provide remedies in addition to, and not in place of, the remedies provided for in Section 1964(a)." Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 569.

29   In dicta, the Second Circuit has expressed "doubts as to the propriety of private party injunctive relief" under RICO. Trane Co. v. O'Connor Sec., 718 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir. 1983). See also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 489 n.20 (2d Cir. 1984) ("It . . . seems altogether likely that § 1964(c) as it now stands was not intended to provide private parties injunctive relief."), rev'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 479 (1985).

30   Compare Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1080-89 (9th Cir. 1986) (concluding that RICO's legislative history forecloses injunctions for private plaintiffs), with Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 695 (7th Cir. 2001) (concluding that "the [*83]  text of the RICO statute, understood in the proper light, itself authorizes private parties to seek injunctive relief'), rev'd on other grounds, 537 U.S. 393 (2003).

31   Compare Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 974 F. Supp. 2d 362, 568-70 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (concluding that equitable relief is available in private RICO actions), with Am. Med. Ass'n v. United Healthcare Corp., 588 F. Supp. 2d 432, 446 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("Based upon the weight of Second Circuit authority and Congress's failure to address the issue within the statutory language itself, this Court will not infer that the right to injunctive and declaratory relief exists for private litigants under Section 1964 of RICO.").

2. "Persons" Suable under RICO

The Tribal Defendants assert that RICO does not apply substantively to the Tribe (or to them, by extension) because tribal sovereigns "are not expressly included among the 'persons' or entities subject" to RICO. (Doc. 66 at 20 n.7.) Section 1962(c) applies to "person[s]." The statute defines "person" to include "any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (emphasis added). That broad definition contains no specific exemption for tribes. Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (specifically excluding Indian tribes from the definition of "employer" for the purposes of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act).

According to one prominent treatise, governmental entities "are not subject to RICO liability [*84]  as defendants." Gregory P. Joseph, Civil RICO: A Definitive Guide § 11(A). "There is some disparity in the case law as to whether governmental entities should be deemed not to be 'persons' or should be recognized as 'persons' but simply immune ones." Id. For most purposes, "[t]he result is the same: they cannot successfully be sued." Id. The Tribal Defendants' argument, however, requires a decision on the precise rationale.32

32   In many contexts, it may be sensible to conclude that it is unnecessary to determine the precise rationale for immunity because, absent immunity, a successful RICO claim against a governmental entity could heap duplicative financial harm on taxpayers who might already have been harmed. See id. That concern plays no role in this case, however, because the Tribal Defendants cannot be liable for money damages.

The court concludes that, for the purposes of RICO, tribes are "persons" but that they enjoy immunity. This follows from the natural reading of the broad definition of "person" in § 1961(3)--it includes any "entity" capable of holding an interest in property. Sovereign governments like state governments are governmental entities. Entity, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). It follows [*85]  that tribal governments are also "entities." And there is no dispute that such entities are capable of holding an interest in property.

As discussed above, tribes enjoy immunity. But, as also discussed above, the immunity of tribal officials in their official capacity is limited by the analogy to Ex Parte Young. The court therefore concludes that tribal officials in their official capacity may be sued for injunctive relief for conduct occurring outside of Indian lands that violates 18 U.S.C. § 1962.

3. Mens Rea

The mens rea requirement in RICO is coextensive with the mens rea requirement found in the predicate crimes. United States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 512 (2d Cir. 1986). The Tribal Defendants contend that Plaintiffs cannot establish the requisite mens rea for a RICO violation. (Doc. 66 at 46.) Plaintiffs maintain that the Tribal Defendants' argument is "irrelevant" and "based on several incorrect premises." (Doc. 85 at 127-28.)

The Tribal Defendants' argument might be persuasive if the rationale for the Tribe's immunity were that, as a governmental entity, the Tribe is incapable of forming the mens rea necessary for a predicate RICO act. Some courts have indeed rested on similar rationales. See Lancaster Cmty. Hosp. v. Antelope Valley Hosp. Dist., 940 F.2d 397, 404 (9th Cir. 1991) (RICO claims failed because "government entities are incapable [*86]  of forming a malicious intent"); Andrade v. Chojnacki, 65 F. Supp. 2d 431, 449 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (same; quoting Lancaster); see also Gregory P. Joseph, Civil RICO: A Definitive Guide § 11(A) ("Most courts reason that state and local governments are immune from RICO liability because they are incapable of forming the mens rea necessary to commit a predicate act." (collecting cases)). That rationale, however, is unpersuasive. As the Third Circuit has observed, it "does not distinguish adequately those situations where municipal corporations are indeed held liable for the tortious or criminal acts of [their] officials, even where such acts require a malicious, willful or criminal intent." Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 909 (3d Cir. 1991).

The Tribal Defendants also contend that the FAC fails to allege that any of them "intended to defraud the Plaintiffs as required by the mail and wire fraud statutes." (Doc. 66 at 48 n.36.) According to the Tribal Defendants, the FAC alleges that Mr. Rees and Think Finance entered into agreements with the Tribal Defendants' predecessors, not the Tribal Defendants themselves. (See id. (citing FAC ¶ 209).) That argument, however, ignores the fact that the Tribal Defendants are sued in their official capacity--as the individual official representatives who, according to [*87]  the FAC, have authority to stop the allegedly illegal conduct. The "intent" to be analyzed is the intent of the entity that the Tribal Defendants represent.

4. Injury; Causation

To establish a RICO claim, a plaintiff must prove, among other things, that she suffered "an injury to business or property." DeFalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 305 (2d Cir. 2001). The Tribal Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that they have suffered any such injury. (Doc. 66 at 45.) Mr. Rees argues the same. (Doc. 67-2 at 34.) The court rejects those arguments for the same reasons that it concludes that Plaintiffs have constitutional standing: they have a direct, personal stake in the dispute. They explicitly claim that they paid excessive interest. (Doc. 18 ¶ 115.) Their claims demonstrate their interest in the subject matter of this lawsuit and the clear potential for relief in their individual cases.

The "by reason of language in § 1964(c) "require[s] a showing that the defendant's violation not only was a 'but for' cause of his injury, but was the proximate cause as well." Sergeants Benevolent Ass'n Health & Welfare Fund v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S. LLP, 806 F.3d 71, 86 (2d Cir. 2015) (alteration in original) (quoting Holmes v. Sec. Inv'r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)). The proximate cause requirement "mandates 'some direct relation between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged' that is not 'too remote.'" [*88]  Id. (quoting Holmes, 503 U.S. at 268).

Mr. Rees contends that Plaintiffs have failed to allege that their harm was proximately caused by any alleged RICO violation. (Doc. 67-2 at 35.) He argues that "[n]owhere in the FAC is it alleged that Plaintiffs or anyone else relied upon any misrepresentations by Rees in deciding to enter into the loans." (Id. at 36.) "And, nowhere in the FAC are there facts alleged demonstrating that it was a misrepresentation or fraudulent conduct by Rees that caused plaintiffs to suffer their injury." (Id.) Plaintiffs insist that, as borrowers of usurious debt, they meet the proximate cause test for RICO. (Doc. 85 at 133.)

Here, the FAC alleges that "Plaintiffs would not have had their bank accounts debited with illegal ACH transactions [electronic withdrawals from the customers' accounts] in excess of any legal amount of interest but for Defendants Rees and Think Finance establishing and running the corrupt enterprise of Plain Green." (Doc. 18 ¶ 115.) Of course, alleging but-for causation does not necessarily establish proximate causation. But the allegations of the FAC sufficiently claim a relation between the allegedly injurious conduct and the injury that is not "too remote." The conduct at issue includes the alleged marketing and collection of usurious [*89]  interest rates. The injury is the alleged payment of interest at excessive rates. That is a sufficiently direct relationship to satisfy proximate cause. Mr. Rees's argument that Plaintiffs have failed to allege reliance on any misrepresentation does not alter that conclusion and, as discussed below, fails to address the core of the scheme alleged in the FAC.

5. Enterprise; Distinctiveness

The FAC alleges that Plain Green is an "enterprise" within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). (Doc. 18 ¶ 76.) That is a legal conclusion, not a factual allegation. But no Defendant challenges the "enterprise" element of Plaintiffs' RICO claim insofar as Plaintiffs claim that Plain Green is the "enterprise" at issue.

The Tribal Defendants do contend, however, that Plaintiffs' RICO theory violates the "distinctiveness" requirement. (Doc. 66 at 47 n.35.) According to the Tribal Defendants, by suing them in their official capacities as officers and directors of Plain Green, Plaintiffs are functionally suing Plain Green. Thus, according to the Tribal Defendants, Plaintiffs have designated Plain Green as both the RICO defendant and enterprise, which the Tribal Defendants say is fatal to Plaintiffs' RICO theory. (Id.)

It is time [*90]  that, "[u]nder section 1962(c), a defendant and the enterprise must be distinct." DeFalco, 244 F.3d at 307. However, Plaintiffs are suing the Tribal Defendants not solely as directors of Plain Green, but also as official representatives of the Tribe. (See Doc. 18 ¶ 209.) The Tribal Defendants concede that the Tribe and Plain Green are distinct entities. (Doc. 92 at 19 n.14.) The court concludes that the allegations in the FAC do not violate RICO's distinctiveness requirement.

6. Management and Operation

A necessary element for liability under § 1962(c) is that the defendant "conduct[ed] or participate[d], directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [the] enterprise's affairs." 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Interpreting that provision, the Supreme Court has held that such conduct or participation requires that a defendant "participate in the operation or management of the enterprise itself." Reyes v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 185 (1993). Under that "operation or management" test, "participation" requires a defendant to have "some part in directing" the enterprise's affairs, and thus RICO liability for "participation" is "not limited to those with primary responsibility for the enterprise's affairs." Id. Liability under § 1962(c) is not limited to "upper management"; an enterprise may be "operated" "not just by upper management but also by lower [*91]  rung participants in the enterprise who are under the direction of upper management." Id. at 184. The court discusses whether each set of Defendants meets this test.33

33   The Tribal Defendants raise no argument on this RICO element; presumably because, as directors of Plain Green, they would indisputably meet the operation or management test.

a. Mr. Rees and the Think Defendants

Mr. Rees and the Think Defendants contend that the FAC does no more than allege that they provided services to the alleged enterprise, and that such allegations fall short of alleging their "operation or management." (Doc. 65 at 14; see also Doc. 67-2 at 46.) It is true that, in the term sheet, Think Finance described what it brought to the deal with the Tribe as "services":

   TF will license its software to the Tribe pursuant to a software license agreement acceptable to the parties. TF will also provide risk management, application processing, underwriting assistance, payment processing, and ongoing customer service support coterminous with the software license agreement and market and/or identify access channels for consumer loans on the Tribe's behalf (jointly "Services").

(Doc. 18-1 at 1.) Plaintiffs note that the FAC explicitly [*92]  asserts that Think Finance did more than provide "services." (See Doc. 18 ¶ 101 ("Defendants Rees and Think Finance hoped to avoid liability by falsely claiming that they only provided services to Plain Green, when in reality they created the whole enterprise and ran its operation through an assortment of subsidiaries and affiliates like Defendants Tailwind Marketing, TC Loan, and TC Decision Sciences.").) According to the Think Defendants, that allegation is merely conclusory. (Doc. 96 at 4.)

Evaluating the factual allegations in the FAC, the court concludes that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Rees and Think Finance "participated" in the operation or management of the enterprise. The FAC alleges that Rees and Think Finance prepared the term sheet (Doc. 18 ¶ 78), which required the Tribe to "adopt a finance code that is acceptable to all parties and provide for the licensing of an arm of the tribe to engage in consumer lending" (id. ¶ 79).34 The FAC further asserts that Rees and Think Finance "intentionally and willfully dominated and still dominate the operations of Plain Green" and "provided everything that the enterprise needed to operate." (Id. ¶ 80.) Rees and Think Finance [*93]  also "defined precisely the type of loan Plain Green would offer to customers and the terms on which the loan would be offered," (id. ¶ 83), and required the enterprise to enter into certain banking and attorney-client relationships (id. ¶¶ 85, 87). The court concludes that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that both Think Finance and Mr. Rees have played at least some part in directing the affairs of the enterprise.

34   Rees points out that he is not a party to the term sheet, nor is he a signatory to it. (Doc. 98 at 16.) Inspection of the term sheet (Doc. 18-1) reveals that to be true, but does not foreclose the plausible allegation that Rees prepared the term sheet (or caused it to be prepared) for execution by the parties to that document.

The court cannot reach the same conclusion with respect to TC Loan Service, LLC, TC Decision Sciences, LLC, and Tailwind Marketing, LLC. The FAC alleges that Mr. Rees and Think Finance created those entities as subsidiaries (id. ¶ 99), and that Mr. Rees and Think Finance "control and dominate" them (see id. ¶¶ 89, 90). No allegations in the FAC describe those entities as having any role in directing the affairs of the enterprise. The court will accordingly [*94]  DISMISS the RICO claim against those Defendants.

b. TCV and Sequoia

TCV and Sequoia each argue that the FAC fails to allege that they conducted or participated in the enterprise's affairs. (Doc. 76 at 22; Doc. 77-1 at 19.) The principal factual allegations against these two Defendants are as follows:

   Defendants Sequoia and Technology Crossover Ventures provide money that is used to start the illegal lending process. They reap rewards through obtaining significant returns on the investment of their funds in the enterprise. Sequoia and Technology Crossover were fully aware of the practices of the enterprise and knew that the practices violated the law. Sequoia and Technology Crossover do not make investments without substantial due diligence into their investments, including legal review of the activities of their investment vehicle.

(Doc. 18 ¶ 154.) The FAC also asserts that Sequoia and TCV "executed a series of agreements that documented their relationship with Defendants Rees and Think Finance" but that "[t]hey have concealed these arrangements through confidentiality clauses in the agreements" and have refused to comment on their role in the RICO enterprise. (Id. ¶ 155.) None of those allegations [*95]  describe TCV or Sequoia as having any role in directing the affairs of the enterprise.

Allegations that TCV and Sequoia provided financing to the RICO enterprise are not sufficient to show that they conducted or participated in the enterprise's affairs.35 Allegations that TCV and Sequoia are "investors" (shareholders) in Think Finance, or obtained returns on those investments, are similarly insufficient. Neither would TCV and Sequoia be RICO "participants" just because they were "fully aware" of Plain Green's practices. See Rosner v. Bank of China, 528 F. Supp. 2d 419, 423, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (despite allegations that bank "knew about the fraudulent scheme and its role in the fraudulent scheme," bank's provision of banking services did not qualify as participation in a RICO enterprise); Dep't of Econ. Dev. v. Arthur Andersen & Co. (U.S.A.), 924 F. Supp. 449, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ("One can 'knowingly participate' in fraud without having 'some part in directing the affairs of the enterprise.'").

35   See Alkhatib v. N.Y. Motor Grp. LLC, No. CV-13-2337(ARR), 2015 WL 3507340, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. June 3, 2015) (bank did not satisfy operation or management test where its only alleged activities were "summarily granting the loan applications created by the dealership defendants, failing to investigate the plaintiffs' claims of fraud, and collecting the payments due under the allegedly fraudulent loans"); Berry v. Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Americas, No. 07 Civ. 7634(WHP), 2008 WL 4694968, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2008) ("Lending [*96]  money to an enterprise does not establish a role in 'directing the enterprise's affairs.'"); Rosner v. Bank of China, 528 F. Supp. 2d 419, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (Bank of China's alleged provision of banking services that aided in the perpetration of a fraudulent scheme did not qualify as participation in a RICO enterprise); Sumitomo Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, No. 99Civ.4004(JSM), 2000 WL 1616960, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000) ("[M]erely providing financing to a RICO enterprise did not constitute participation in the affairs of the enterprise." (citing Schmidt v. Fleet Bank, 16 F. Supp. 2d 340, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 1998))).

Plaintiffs argue that Sumitomo and Rosner--cited in the footnote above--actually support their position. The court disagrees. In Sumitomo, the plaintiff, Sumitomo Corporation, sued two major banks, alleging that they participated in a scheme to defraud Sumitomo "by structuring certain transactions so that they appeared to be normal copper transactions without disclosing other related transactions that transformed these transactions into bank loans of which plaintiff was unaware." Sumitomo, 2000 WL 1616960, at *1. The "enterprise" in that case was a former Sumitomo employee, Hamanaka, and each of the two banks. The court recognized that merely providing financing to a RICO enterprise would not constitute "participation" in the affairs of the enterprise, but held that the complaints sufficiently alleged "participation" because "it is the fraudulent [*97]  financing operation which is itself the RICO enterprise, and the complaints sufficiently allege the particular defendant's participation in its affairs." Id. Here, the FAC does allege a fraudulent financing operation (Plain Green), but that operation extends financing to consumers like Plaintiffs. TCV and Sequoia are not themselves alleged to be the RICO "enterprise"; nor are they alleged to directly make loans to consumers.

Rosner is similarly unpersuasive. The court in that case referenced an earlier related action--Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. International Financial Services (New York), Inc., 323 F. Supp. 2d 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)--in which Sociedade Comercial Siu Lap Limitada (Siu Lap) was a defendant held liable for fraudulently and without authorization engaging in transactions in foreign currency futures contracts.36 Siu Lap's role in the fraudulent scheme involved funding codefendant International Financial Services, Inc. See Rosner, 528 F. Supp. 2d at 422. That was not Siu Lap's only role,37 but even assuming it was, Siu Lap was held liable not under RICO, but under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). Int'l Fin. Servs., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 485. Plaintiffs do not explain how Siu Lap's liability under the CEA has any bearing on the "operation or management" element that appears in RICO.

36   The claims against Siu Lap were not resolved in the 2004 decision. The court had entered [*98]  default judgment against Siu Lap in 2002. See Order of Default Judgment, Int'l Fin. Servs., No. 1:02-cv-5497-GEL (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2002), ECF No. 19.

37   Siu Lap also "hired inexperienced currency traders as independent contractors, grouped the traders by their ethnicity, and encouraged them to solicit customers from their respective ethnic communities." Id. The independent contractors then misled customers. See id.

Plaintiffs say they have "additional allegations" (not appearing in the FAC) regarding TCV and Sequoia's "participation" in the affairs of the enterprise. (Doc. 85 at 101, 107; Doc. 85-1.) Plaintiffs assert that TCV General Partner John Rosenberg has served on the Think Finance Board since 2009. (Doc. 85-1 ¶ 1.) Plaintiffs also say that Sequoia General Partner Michael Goguen previously served as a director of Think Finance. (Id. ¶ 3.) Plaintiffs allege that both Rosenberg and Goguen were "fully aware" of the Plain Green enterprise (id. ¶¶ 1, 3), and that they both "directed the strategy that Think Finance followed, including its domination and control of Plain Green" (id. ¶¶ 2, 4).

TCV and Sequoia both contend that Plaintiffs' reliance on allegations not appearing in the FAC [*99]  is procedurally improper. (Doc. 97 at 12; Doc. 99 at 8.) The court agrees. See Sherman v. Ben & Jerry's Franchising, Inc., No. 1:08-CV-207, 2009 WL 2462539, at *8 (D. Vt. Aug. 10, 2009) (supplementary allegations that did not appear in the Amended Complaint were improper because "parties may not amend the complaint through supportive memoranda" (citing Wright v. Ernst & Young LLP, 152 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 1998))). The court's analysis is limited to the FAC as it stands currently.

However, since the court is permitting discovery as to TCV and Sequoia's minimum contacts with Vermont, the court will also permit Plaintiffs to discover facts related to the "additional allegations." To defeat a jurisdiction-testing motion after such discovery, Plaintiffs will be required to aver "facts that, if credited by the trier, would suffice to establish jurisdiction" over TCV and Sequoia. Dorchester, 722 F.3d at 85 (quoting Ball v. Metallurgie Hoboken-Overpelt, S.A., 902 F.2d 194, 197 (2d Cir. 1990)). Meanwhile, the court will defer ruling on any of the claims against Sequoia and TCV.

7. Racketeering

Under RICO, "racketeering activity" includes "any act which is indictable under . . . [18 U.S.C.] section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), [or] section 1343 (relating to wire fraud)." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B). "A complaint alleging mail and wire fraud must show (1) the existence of a scheme to defraud, (2) defendant's knowing or intentional participation in the scheme, and [*100]  (3) the use of interstate mails or transmission facilities in furtherance of the scheme." S.Q.K.F.C., Inc. v. Bell Atl. TriCon Leasing Corp., 84 F.3d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1996). Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to state a racketeering claim for a variety of reasons.

a. Scheme to Defraud

"The mail and wire fraud statutes do not define 'scheme to defraud,' but it has been described as a plan to deprive a person 'of something of value by trick, deceit, chicane or overreaching.'" United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 115 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987)). "It is characterized by a departure from community standards of 'fair play and candid dealings.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Ragosta, 970 F.2d 1085, 1090 (2d Cir. 1992)). "[M]ateriality of falsehood" is an element of a scheme to defraud. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999).

Plaintiffs' theory is that Mr. Rees and Think Finance "had a plan or scheme to defraud thousands of people in a financially challenged position by extending loans at illegally high and extortionate interest rates, while at the same time claiming that the business was legitimate and in compliance with the law." (Doc. 18 ¶ 101.) According to Plaintiffs, Rees and Think Finance used Plain Green and the Tribal Defendants as "intermediaries" and Tailwind, TC Loan, and TC Decision Sciences as "subsidiaries and affiliates" to advance the scheme. (Id.) The FAC outlines alleged misrepresentations in furtherance of the [*101]  alleged scheme as including: (1) that Plain Green was the lender; (2) that Chippewa Cree law governed; (3) that the lender was not subject to any state or federal laws; (4) that Plain Green loans are less expensive than a payday loan; (5) that Plain Green charges low fees. (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 106, 107, 124, 125, 126.) According to the FAC, those alleged misrepresentations appear on Plain Green's website and in the arbitration agreements. (See id.)

The parties devote considerable energy to discussing whether those five statements are true, whether they are material, and whether they are sufficiently specific under Rule 9(b). All of those arguments distract from the real question. Representations that Think Green's business model is legal or that it offers a good deal are not at the core of the alleged scheme. Rather, the alleged plan--as the court understands it--was to avoid financial regulation of consumer lending. That is the alleged "falsehood" at issue; the court need not focus on any specific alleged false statements. See United States v. Woods, 335 F.3d 993, 999 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that the Supreme Court in Neder "addressed the materiality of misrepresentation, not the specificity"), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1025 (2003). As the court concluded above, the allegations [*102]  of the FAC are specific and plausible in their description of such a plan.

b. Fraudulent Intent; Participation in Scheme

Mr. Rees and Think Finance contend that the FAC fails to allege that they had any fraudulent intent. (Doc. 65 at 16; Doc. 67-2 at 42.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that they need to plead fraudulent intent, but assert that such intent may be alleged generally under Rule 9(b), and that the FAC alleges Think Finance's direct knowledge and also that it had motive and opportunity. (Doc. 85 at 114.)

Although Rule 9(b) permits intent to be alleged generally, Plaintiffs must still "allege facts that give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent." First Capital Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., 385 F.3d 159, 179 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 189 F.3d 165, 173 (2d Cir. 1999)). "The requisite 'strong inference' of fraud may be established either (a) by alleging facts to show that defendants had both motive and opportunity to commit fraud, or (b) by alleging facts that constitute strong circumstantial evidence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness." Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994).

The court concludes that the FAC pleads sufficient facts to give rise to a strong inference of fraudulent intent. The FAC alleges that Rees, the Think Defendants, and the Tribal Defendants had motives to commit the alleged fraud. According to the FAC, federal [*103]  regulators had shut down Rees's former "rent-a-bank" internet payday business. (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 23, 37-41.) Rees's new venture, Think Finance, is allegedly a different kind of law-avoidance scheme that uses a "rent-a-tribe" model. (Id. ¶ 42; see also id. ¶ 82.) Thus, as the FAC puts it, the motive for Rees and the Think Defendants was to find a business model that would be profitable and that would avoid the legal issues that doomed the previous "rent-a-bank" model. According to the FAC, the Tribe (represented by the Tribal Defendants) also had a motive: it would receive 4.5% of the revenues from the operation. (Id. ¶ 23.) The opportunity for Rees, the Think Defendants, and the Tribal Defendants arose in March 2001 when, according to the FAC, Rees and Think Finance approached the Tribe regarding formation of a tribal entity to conduct an internet-lending operation. (Id. ¶ 77.)

Mr. Rees contends that the FAC fails to allege that he "participated" in any mail or wire fraud. (Doc. 67-2 at 38.) He asserts that a RICO claim against him "cannot be based on allegations that the enterprise simply engaged in acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, or the collection of unlawful debt." (Doc. 98 at 22 (emphasis [*104]  added).) Citing Mills v. Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170, 1175 (2d Cir. 1993), Rees argues that "[c]onclusory allegations that Rees somehow controlled the individual Tribal Defendants to take unspecified actions do not suffice." (Doc. 67-2 at 40.)

It is true that "[t]he focus of section 1962(c) is on the individual patterns of racketeering engaged in by a defendant, rather than the collective activities of the members of the enterprise, which are proscribed by section 1962(d) [RICO's conspiracy provision]." United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 714 (2d Cir. 1987). But the FAC alleges that Rees (and Think Finance), "through their control over" the Tribal Defendants, wired money into and out of Plaintiffs' bank accounts (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 53, 54, 68, 69, 100), and used the mail to collect payments and communicate with other parts of the Plain Green enterprise (id. ¶ 100). The FAC includes more than just bare allegations that Rees was in "control"--it alleges that he (and Think Finance) actually designed the system under which the wire and mail transactions occurred. (See Doc. 18 ¶¶ 23, 81.)38 If that is not an allegation of "participation," it is hard to imagine what might be.

38   Rees describes as "ludicrous" and "incredible" any allegation that he personally deposited funds into or withdrew funds from Plaintiffs' accounts. (Doc. 98 at 16.) The court does not [*105]  read the FAC as alleging that, but instead as alleging that he designed a system under which such transactions would occur. (See Doc. 18 ¶ 10 (alleging that Rees "personally designed and directed the business activity described in this Complaint").)

c. Use of Mails or Wires

The Tribal Defendants contend that the FAC "wholly fails" to establish their liability under a mail fraud theory, and that the FAC "fails to state how the mails were used to further the scheme to defraud." (Doc. 66 at 50 & n.37.) The FAC does indeed allege relatively few facts about the mail; perhaps the most detailed factual allegation is that Defendants Rees and Think Finance "use[d] the mail to collect payments and communicate with other parts of the Plain Green enterprise." (Doc. 18 ¶ 100.) Plaintiffs have clarified that they do not allege that any misstatements were communicated through the mail, but allege mail fraud "solely based on it advancing the fraudulent scheme." (Doc. 85 at 22 n.2.) Therefore, "a detailed description of the underlying scheme and the connection therewith of the mail and/or wire communications, is sufficient to satisfy Rule 9(b)." In re Sumitomo Copper Litig., 995 F. Supp. 451, 456 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). The court concludes that Plaintiffs have alleged a connection between [*106]  the scheme and the mails. The court therefore rejects the Tribal Defendants' argument that the FAC is insufficiently detailed with respect to the allegations of mail fraud.

Plaintiffs assert that they allege wire fraud "based both on Defendants' fraudulent statements and based on the wiring being merely incidental to a larger fraudulent scheme." (Doc. 85 at 22 n.2.) For the reasons stated above, the court concludes that the inquiry need not focus on the five alleged misrepresentations that Plaintiffs say were transmitted over wires. However, Plaintiffs have alleged a detailed description of the scheme, and have also alleged a connection between the scheme and the wires.

8. Collection of Unlawful Debt

Section 1962(c) of Title 18 identifies "collection of unlawful debt" as one of the specific offenses which may give rise to civil liability under the RICO statute. Unlawful debt is defined as a debt:

   (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or which is unenforceable under State or Federal law in whole or in part as to principal or interest because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) which was incurred [*107]  in connection with the business of gambling in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate.

18 U.S.C. § 1961(6). To state a claim for collection of an unlawful debt, Plaintiffs must allege that:

   [1] the debt was unenforceable in whole or in part because of state or federal laws relating to usury, [2] the debt was incurred in connection with the "business of lending money . . . at a [usurious] rate," . . . [3] the usurious rate was at least twice the enforceable rate . . . [4] as a result of the above confluence of factors, it was injured in its business or property.

Sundance Land Corp. v. Cmty. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 840 F.2d 653, 666 (9th Cir. 1988) (alterations and omissions in original) (quoting Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat'l Bank, 755 F.2d 239, 248 (2d Cir. 1985)).

a. Unenforceable Debt

The Tribal Defendants assert that there was no "unlawful debt" in this case because the Tribe's governing law imposes no interest rate cap. (Doc. 66 at 51)39 The Tribal Defendants further contend that no state usury laws can be enforced against them because doing so "would amount to an improper state regulation of on-reservation activity in contravention of well-established [*108]  preemption and infringement principles." (Id.)

39   TCV joins this argument. (Doc. 76 at 22.)

The court rejects the Tribal Defendants' arguments. For the reasons stated above, the court has concluded that, at least on the present record, the relevant conduct occurred outside of the Tribe's lands. See Otoe-Missouria, 769 F.3d at 115. The interest rates charged may not have violated Chippewa Cree law, but under Bay Mills the Tribal Defendants can be sued for injunctive relief if their off-reservation commercial activities violate state law.

b. Business of Lending Money at a Usurious Rate

The Think Defendants contend that the FAC fails to allege that any Defendant was in the "business of lending money at a usurious rate." (Doc. 65 at 19.) According to the Think Defendants, the only entity alleged to be in the "business" of lending money is the alleged RICO enterprise (and non-party) Plain Green. (Id. at 19 n.9.) Plaintiffs argue that they do not have to show that every defendant lent money because RICO only requires that a defendant "conduct or participate, directly or indirectly" in the enterprise's affairs. (Doc. 85 at 96.) In their reply, the Think Defendants return to the refrain that Plaintiffs have failed to satisfy Reve's "operation [*109]  and management" test. (Doc. 96 at 7.) For the reasons stated above, the court agrees that TC Loan Service, LLC, TC Decision Sciences, LLC, and Tailwind Marketing, LLC do not satisfy the "operation and management" test, but that Mr. Rees and Think Finance do.

Mr. Rees and Think Finance also assert that the FAC fails to allege that they themselves acted to "collect" any unlawful debt.40 Think Finance relies on Durante, in which the Second Circuit--tracking the language of § 1962(c)--listed as an element that "the individual defendants participated in the conduct of the affairs of the enterprise through collection of unlawful debt." Durante, 755 F.2d at 248 (emphasis added). Rees contends that a RICO claim against him "cannot be based on allegations that the enterprise simply engaged in acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, or the collection of unlawful debt." (Doc. 98 at 22 (emphasis added).) Thus, both Rees and Think Finance argue that the FAC fails to allege that they individually took any actions constituting collection of unlawful debt. Plaintiffs insist that "[t]here is no requirement that each defendant personally lend any money, only that they participate, directly or indirectly." (Doc. 85 at 96.)41

40   Rees and the Think Defendants [*110]  assert that the proper definition of "collection" for purposes of § 1962(c) is "to induce in any way any person to make repayment thereof." United States v. Pepe, 747 F.2d 632, 674 (11th Cir. 1984). Plaintiffs object that the Think Defendants are inappropriately seeking to add an additional "inducement" element onto RICO. (Doc. 85 at 95.) Plaintiffs argue that, in any case, they have alleged that the Think Defendants "induced" repayment. (Id. at 96.) To the extent that there is an "inducement" element, the court concludes that it is alleged in the FAC by the allegations that funds were actually electronically collected directly from Plaintiffs' bank accounts. (See Doc. 18 ¶¶ 30, 54, 69, 100.)

41   Plaintiffs also assert that they have alleged that Rees and Think Finance "took many acts that were designed to induce the repayment of an unlawful debt." (Doc. 85 at 93.) Referring to the allegations that Rees and Think Finance controlled the Tribal Defendants (Doc. 18 ¶¶ 54, 69), Plaintiffs maintain that the FAC does allege that Rees and Think Finance "collected unlawful debt multiple times from both Jessica Gingras and Angela Given." (Doc. 85 at 94, 96.)

As noted above, "[t]he focus of section 1962(c) is on the individual [acts] engaged in by a defendant, rather than the collective activities [*111]  of the members of the enterprise, which are proscribed by section 1962(d) [RICO's conspiracy provision]." Persico, 832 F.2d at 714. For largely the same reasons stated above regarding racketeering, the court concludes that the FAC adequately alleges that Rees and Think Finance participated in the collection of allegedly unlawful debt. The FAC alleges that Rees and Think Finance designed the system under which borrowers would be charged allegedly usurious interest rates. That is plainly an allegation of "participation."

c. Twice the Enforceable Rate

This element does not appear to be in dispute. The FAC alleges that the rates charged were between 198 and 376% annually--well in excess of twice the rate enforceable under Vermont law.

d. Injury to Business or Property

For the reasons discussed above, the FAC alleges the requisite injury.

Conclusion

All Defendants' motions to compel arbitration (Docs. 64, 66, 67, 77, 76) are DENIED.

The Tribal Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 66) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. On all counts against the Tribal Defendants, Plaintiffs can obtain only prospective injunctive or declaratory relief. Counts One and Two are DISMISSED. Count Three is DISMISSED as to Plaintiff Gingras; but remains as [*112]  to Plaintiff Givens. The Vermont state-law claims (Counts Four and Seven) survive against the Tribal Defendants. The RICO claims (Counts Five and Six) remain in the case. The unjust enrichment claim (Count Seven) also remains.

The Think Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 65) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Counts One and Two are DISMISSED. Count Three is DISMISSED as to Plaintiff Gingras, but remains as to Plaintiff Givens. The VCFA claim (Count Four) remains against the Think Defendants. The RICO claim (Count Six) as against TC Loan, TC Decision, and Tailwind Marketing is DISMISSED, but remains as against Think Finance. The Think Defendants have not sought dismissal of the unjust enrichment claim (Count Seven), so that claim remains against them.

Kenneth Rees's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 67) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Counts One and Two are DISMISSED. Count Three is DISMISSED as to Plaintiff Gingras, but remains as to Plaintiff Givens. The VCFA claim (Count Four) remains against Mr. Rees. The RICO claims (Counts Five and Six) remain against Mr. Rees. The unjust enrichment claim (Count Seven) remains.

TCV and Sequoia's Motions to Dismiss (Docs. 76, 77, respectively) are [*113]  DENIED without prejudice, and may be renewed following discovery on the issue of personal jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Jurisdictional Discovery (Doc. 43) on the issues of subject-matter jurisdiction and arbitration is MOOT.

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