Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

Erie Doctrine: Where State Supreme Court Has Not Spoken, Federal Courts Are Bound by Decisions of State Intermediate Appellate Courts Absent Persuasive Evidence That Supreme Court Would Disagree

Burgess v. Religious Tech. Ctr., Inc., 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 1162 (11th Cir. Jan. 26, 2015):

  To determine whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over RTC, we consider two issues: (1) whether personal jurisdiction exists under the Georgia Long-Arm [*4]  Statute, and (2) if so, whether the exercise of the court's jurisdiction would violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Louis Vuitton Malletier, 736 F.3d at 1350. "When a federal court uses a state long-arm statute, because the extent of the statute is governed by state law, the federal court is required to construe it as would the state's supreme court." Lockard v. Equifax, Inc., 163 F.3d 1259, 1265 (11th Cir. 1998). Therefore, we will interpret and apply Georgia's long-arm statute in the same way as would the Georgia Supreme Court. Where the Georgia Supreme Court has not ruled on an issue of state law, we "are bound by decisions of a state's intermediate appellate courts unless there is persuasive evidence that the highest state court would rule otherwise." Pendergast v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 592 F.3d 1119, 1133 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

Share this article:

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Email

Recent Posts

RICO and Injunctions: (1) State Court Actions Designed to Perpetuate and Monetize a RICO Violation Are Enjoinable under RICO, Even Though They Are Not Themselves Alleged to Be Predicate Acts [Note: Noerr Pennington Applies in RICO Actions] — (2) Although Civil RICO’s Text and Legislative History Fail to Reveal Any Intent to Override the Provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, Arbitrations Are Enjoinable Under the “Effective Vindication” Doctrine Where They Operate As a Prospective Waiver of a Party’s Right to Pursue Statutory RICO Remedies — (3) Arbitration Findings May Be Given Collateral Estoppel Effect in a Civil RICO Action — (4) Injunction of Non-Corrupt State Court Litigations That Furthers a RICO Violation Are Enjoinable Under the Anti-Injunction Act’s “Expressly Authorized” Exception — (5) “The Irreparable Harm Requirement Is The Single Most Important Prerequisite For The Issuance Of A Preliminary Injunction” (Good Quote) — (6) When Injunction Is Based on “Serious Questions on the Merits” Rather Than “Likelihood of Success,” Court May Rely on Unverified Pleadings and Attached Exhibits to Assess the Merits, Unless the Opponent Has Raised Substantial Questions (Here, the Opponent Failed to Request an Evidentiary Hearing) — (7) Whether Amended Pleading Moots An Appeal Turns on Whether It Materially Changes the Substantive Basis for the Appeal — (8) Meaning of “In That” (“Used To Introduce A Statement That Explains Or Gives More Specific Information” About A Prior Statement)

Archives