26(a)(1) Initial Disclosures — Failure to Timely Update to Add Fact Witnesses Mentioned in Deposition Leads to Exclusion, Even Though They Were Identified 10 Months before Trial — Good Quotes on Prejudice

Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 18020 (9th Cir. Sept. 19, 2014):

We next address the exclusion of fact witnesses. The general issue is whether witnesses not listed in Rule 26(a) disclosures--and who were identified  15 months after the discovery cutoff and only ten months before trial--were identified too late in the process.

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require parties to provide to other parties "the name . . . of each individual likely to have discoverable information--along with the subjects of that information--that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(i). And "[a] party who has made a disclosure under Rule 26(a) . . . must supplement or correct its disclosure" in a "timely manner if the party learns that in some material respect the disclosure . . . is incomplete or incorrect, and if the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing." Id. R. 26(e). A party that does not timely identify a witness under Rule 26 may not use that witness to supply evidence at a trial "unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless." Id. R. 37(c)(1); see also Yeti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1105. Indeed, Rule 37(c)(1) is "intended to put teeth into the mandatory . . . disclosure requirements" of Rule 26(a) and (e). 8B Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2289.1 (3d ed. 2014).

The district court excluded 38 Sweetwater witnesses as [*34]  untimely disclosed, in violation of Rule 26(a) and (e), in part because it found "no reason why any of the 38 witnesses were not disclosed to [P]laintiffs either initially or by timely supplementation." The district court concluded that "the mere mention of a name in a deposition is insufficient" to notify Plaintiffs that Sweetwater "intend[s] to present that person at trial," and that to "suggest otherwise flies in the face of the requirements of Rule 26." And the district court reasoned that "[w]aiting until long after the close of discovery and on the eve of trial to disclose allegedly relevant and noncumulative witnesses is harmful and without substantial justification."

A "district court has wide discretion in controlling discovery." Jeff D., 643 F.3d at 289 (internal quotation marks omitted). And, as we noted earlier, that discretion is "particularly wide" when it comes to excluding witnesses under Rule 37(c)(1). Yeti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1106.

Sweetwater argues that exclusion of 30 of its 38 witnesses was an abuse of discretion because (1) "Plaintiffs were made aware" of those witnesses during discovery--specifically, during Plaintiffs' depositions of other Sweetwater witnesses, and (2) any violation of Rule 26 "was harmless to Plaintiffs." Of the remaining eight witnesses, Sweetwater contends that [*35]  untimely disclosure was both justified because those witnesses were not employed at Castle Park before the discovery cutoff date, and harmless because they were disclosed more than eight months before trial. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing a discovery sanction. The record amply supports the district court's discretionary determination that Sweetwater's lapse was not justified or harmless.

Initial Rule 26(a) disclosures were due October 29, 2007. At least 12 of Sweetwater's 38 contested witnesses were Castle Park employees by that date. The discovery cutoff was August 8, 2008, and lay witness depositions had to be completed by September 30, 2008. At least 19 of the 38 witnesses were Castle Park employees by those dates. And yet, Sweetwater did not disclose any of the 38 witnesses until November 23, 2009, more than 15 months after the close of discovery and less than a year before trial.

Sweetwater does not dispute that it did not formally offer the names of any of the 38 witnesses by the October 29, 2007, deadline for initial Rule 26(a) disclosures (or by the August 8, 2008, discovery cutoff, for that matter). Nor does it dispute that it did not "supplement or [*36]  correct its disclosure or response," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), by offering the witnesses' names in accord with Rule 26(e). Instead, Sweetwater contends that because other disclosed witnesses had mentioned the contested witnesses at their depositions, Plaintiffs were on notice that the contested witnesses might testify and were not prejudiced by untimely disclosure. Sweetwater contends, in essence, that it complied with Rule 26 because Plaintiffs knew of the contested witnesses' existence.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting Sweetwater's argument. The theory of disclosure under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to encourage parties to try cases on the merits, not by surprise, and not by ambush. After disclosures of witnesses are made, a party can conduct discovery of what those witnesses would say on relevant issues, which in turn informs the party's judgment about which witnesses it may want to call at trial, either to controvert testimony or to put it in context. Orderly procedure requires timely disclosure so that trial efforts are enhanced and efficient, and the trial process is improved. The late disclosure of witnesses throws a wrench into the machinery of trial. A party might be able [*37]  to scramble to make up for the delay, but last-minute discovery may disrupt other plans. And if the discovery cutoff has passed, the party cannot conduct discovery without a court order permitting extension. This in turn threatens whether a scheduled trial date is viable. And it impairs the ability of every trial court to manage its docket.

With these considerations in mind, we return to the governing rules. Rule 26 states that "a party must, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to the other parties . . . the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely to have discoverable information." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Compliance with Rule 26's disclosure requirements is "mandatory." Repulic of Ecuador v. Mackay, 742 F.3d 860, 865 (9th Cir. 2014).

The rule places the disclosure obligation on a "party." That another witness has made a passing reference in a deposition to a person with knowledge or responsibilities who could conceivably be a witness does not satisfy a party's disclosure obligations. An adverse party should not have to guess which undisclosed witnesses may be called to testify. We--and the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure--have warned litigants not to "'indulge in gamesmanship with respect to [*38]  the disclosure obligations'" of Rule 26. Marchand v. Mercy Med. Ctr., 22 F.3d 933, 936 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (1993 amend.)). The record shows that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Sweetwater's attempt to obfuscate the meaning of Rule 26(a) was just this sort of gamesmanship. There was no error in the district court's conclusion that "the mere mention of a name in a deposition is insufficient to give notice to" Plaintiffs that Sweetwater "intend[ed] to present that person at trial."

The district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that Sweetwater's failure to comply with Rule 26's disclosure requirement was neither substantially justified nor harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Sweetwater does not argue that its untimely disclosure of these 30 witnesses was substantially justified. Nor was it harmless. Had Sweetwater's witnesses been allowed to testify at trial, Plaintiffs would have had to depose them--or at least to consider which witnesses were worth deposing--and to prepare to question them at trial. See Yeti by Molly, 259 F.3d at 1107. The record demonstrates that the district court's conclusion, that reopening discovery before trial would have burdened Plaintiffs and disrupted the court's and the parties' schedules, was well within its discretion.  The last thing a party or its counsel wants in a hotly contested lawsuit is to make last-minute preparations and decisions on the run. The late disclosures here were not harmless. See Hoffman v. Constr. Protective Servs., Inc., 541 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2008).

Nor did the district court abuse its discretion by finding that the untimely disclosure of the eight remaining witnesses also was not harmless. Allowing these witnesses to testify and reopening discovery would have had the same costly and disruptive effects. Nor was it substantially justified merely because the eight witnesses were not employed at Castle Park until after the discovery cutoff date. Sanctioning this argument would force us to read the supplementation requirement out of Rule 26(e). We will not do that.

Sweetwater did not comply with the disclosure requirements of Rule 26(a) and (e). That failure was neither substantially justified nor harmless. The district court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Sweetwater's 38 untimely disclosed witnesses from testifying at trial.

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