In re Kellogg, Brown & Root, Inc., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 12115 (D.C. Cir. June 27, 2014) (Note:  The Court’s privilege analysis was excerpted in our post of July 3, 2014):

Having concluded that the District Court's privilege ruling constituted error, we still must decide whether that error justifies a writ of mandamus. See 28 U.S.C. § 1651. Mandamus is a "drastic and extraordinary" remedy "reserved for really extraordinary causes." Cheney v. U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 542 U.S. 367, 380 (2004) (quoting Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947)). In keeping with that high standard, the Supreme Court in Cheney stated that three conditions must be satisfied before a court grants a writ of mandamus: (1) the mandamus petitioner must have "no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires," (2) the mandamus petitioner must show that his right to the issuance of the writ is "clear and indisputable," and (3) the court, "in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances." Id. at 380-81 (quoting and citing Kerr v. United States District Court for the Northern District of California, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)).  [*16] We conclude that all three conditions are satisfied in this case.

A

First, a mandamus petitioner must have "no other adequate means to attain the relief he desires." Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380. That initial requirement will often be met in cases where a petitioner claims that a district court erroneously ordered disclosure of attorney-client privileged documents. That is because (i) an interlocutory appeal is not available in attorney-client privilege cases (absent district court certification) and (ii) appeal after final judgment will come too late because the privileged communications will already have been disclosed pursuant to the district court's order.

The Supreme Court has ruled that an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine is not available in attorney-client privilege cases. See Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106-13 (2009); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291. To be sure, a party in KBR's position may ask the district court to certify the privilege question for interlocutory appeal. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). But that avenue is available only at the discretion of the district court. And here, the District Court denied KBR's request for certification. See  [*17] United States ex rel. Barko v. Halliburton Co., No. 05-cv-1276, 2014 WL 929430, at *1-3 (D.D.C. Mar. 11, 2014). It is also true that a party in KBR's position may defy the district court's ruling and appeal if the district court imposes contempt sanctions for non-disclosure. But as this Court has explained, forcing a party to go into contempt is not an "adequate" means of relief in these circumstances. See In re Sealed Case, 151 F.3d 1059, 1064-65 (D.C. Cir. 1998); see also In re City of New York, 607 F.3d 923, 934 (2d Cir. 2010) (same).

On the other hand, appeal after final judgment will often come too late because the privileged materials will already have been released. In other words, "the cat is out of the bag." In re Papandreou, 139 F.3d 247, 251 (D.C. Cir. 1998). As this Court and others have explained, post-release review of a ruling that documents are unprivileged is often inadequate to vindicate a privilege the very purpose of which is to prevent the release of those confidential documents. See id.; see also In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2008) ("a remedy after final judgment cannot unsay the confidential information that has been revealed") (quoting In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 99 (2d Cir. 1987)).

For  [*18] those reasons, the first condition for mandamus -- no other adequate means to obtain relief -- will often be satisfied in attorney-client privilege cases. Barko responds that the Supreme Court in Mohawk, although addressing only the availability of interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine, in effect also barred the use of mandamus in attorney-client privilege cases. According to Barko, Mohawk means that the first prong of the mandamus test cannot be met in attorney-client privilege cases because of the availability of post-judgment appeal. That is incorrect. It is true that Mohawk held that attorney-client privilege rulings are not appealable under the collateral order doctrine because "postjudgment appeals generally suffice to protect the rights of litigants and ensure the vitality of the attorney-client privilege." 558 U.S. at 109. But at the same time, the Court repeatedly and expressly reaffirmed that mandamus -- as opposed to the collateral order doctrine -- remains a "useful safety valve" in some cases of clear error to correct "some of the more consequential attorney-client privilege rulings." Id. at 110-12 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). It would  [*19] make little sense to read Mohawk to implicitly preclude mandamus review in all cases given that Mohawk explicitly preserved mandamus review in some cases. Other appellate courts that have considered this question have agreed. See Hernandez v. Tanninen, 604 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2010); In re Whirlpool Corp., 597 F.3d 858, 860 (7th Cir. 2010); see also In re Perez, 749 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2014) (granting mandamus after Mohawk on informants privilege ruling); City of New York, 607 F.3d at 933 (same on law enforcement privilege ruling).

B

Second, a mandamus petitioner must show that his right to the issuance of the writ is "clear and indisputable." Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381. Although the first mandamus requirement is often met in attorney-client privilege cases, this second requirement is rarely met. An erroneous district court ruling on an attorney-client privilege issue by itself does not justify mandamus. The error has to be clear. As a result, appellate courts will often deny interlocutory mandamus petitions advancing claims of error by the district court on attorney-client privilege matters. In this case, for the reasons explained at length in Part II, we conclude that the District  [*20] Court's privilege ruling constitutes a clear legal error. The second prong of the mandamus test is therefore satisfied in this case.

C

Third, before granting mandamus, we must be "satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances." Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381. As its phrasing suggests, that is a relatively broad and amorphous totality of the circumstances consideration. The upshot of the third factor is this: Even in cases of clear district court error on an attorney-client privilege matter, the circumstances may not always justify mandamus.

In this case, considering all of the circumstances, we are convinced that mandamus is appropriate. The District Court's privilege ruling would have potentially far-reaching consequences. In distinguishing Upjohn, the District Court relied on a number of factors that threaten to vastly diminish the attorney-client privilege in the business setting. Perhaps most importantly, the District Court's distinction of Upjohn on the ground that the internal investigation here was conducted pursuant to a compliance program mandated by federal regulations would potentially upend certain settled understandings and practices. Because defense contractors  [*21] are subject to regulatory requirements of the sort cited by the District Court, the logic of the ruling would seemingly prevent any defense contractor from invoking the attorney-client privilege to protect internal investigations undertaken as part of a mandatory compliance program. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.203-13 (2010). And because a variety of other federal laws require similar internal controls or compliance programs, many other companies likewise would not be able to assert the privilege to protect the records of their internal investigations. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2), 7262; 41 U.S.C. § 8703. As KBR explained, the District Court's decision "would disable most public companies from undertaking confidential internal investigations." KBR Pet. 19. As amici added, the District Court's novel approach has the potential to "work a sea change in the well-settled rules governing internal corporate investigations." Br. of Chamber of Commerce et al. as Amici Curaie 1; see KBR Reply Br. 1 n.1 (citing commentary to same effect); Andy Liu et al., How To Protect Internal Investigation Materials from Disclosure, 56 Government Contractor ¶ 108 (Apr. 9, 2014) (assessing broad impact of ruling  [*22] on government contractors).

To be sure, there are limits to the impact of a single district court ruling because it is not binding on any other court or judge. But prudent counsel monitor court decisions closely and adapt their practices in response. The amicus brief in this case, which was joined by numerous business and trade associations, convincingly demonstrates that many organizations are well aware of and deeply concerned about the uncertainty generated by the novelty and breadth of the District Court's reasoning. That uncertainty matters in the privilege context, for the Supreme Court has told us that an "uncertain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no privilege at all." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981). More generally, this Court has long recognized that mandamus can be appropriate to "forestall future error in trial courts" and "eliminate uncertainty" in important areas of law. Colonial Times, Inc. v. Gasch, 509 F.2d 517, 524 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Other courts have granted mandamus based on similar considerations. See In re Sims, 534 F.3d 117, 129 (2d Cir. 2008) (granting  [*23] mandamus where "immediate resolution will avoid the development of discovery practices or doctrine undermining the privilege") (quotation omitted); In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (same). The novelty of the District Court's privilege ruling, combined with its potentially broad and destabilizing effects in an important area of law, convinces us that granting the writ is "appropriate under the circumstances." Cheney, 542 U.S. at 381. In saying that, we do not mean to imply that all of the circumstances present in this case are necessary to meet the third prong of the mandamus test. But they are sufficient to do so here. We therefore grant KBR's petition for a writ of mandamus.