Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

Circuit Splits Created with Trepidation — Good Quotes

Anderson v. Private Capital Grp., Inc., 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 20613 (10th Cir. Oct. 10, 2013):

We need not reach any general conclusions regarding whether the void ab initio exception has any room to operate in the Tenth Circuit. It is sufficient for us to say that Mr. Anderson has failed to offer us any cogent reasons why we should split from the heavy weight of authority in our sister circuits that has either rejected the exception in full or limited its scope to the bankruptcy context, which is inapposite here. Indeed, Mr. Anderson has not even attempted to grapple with this contrary authority. In sum, he has given us no sound reason to overcome the historic reluctance of circuit courts to create inter-circuit splits. See Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1521 (10th Cir. 1991) ("Splitting the circuits always is something we approach with trepidation."); accord United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 396 F.3d 1190, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that "we avoid creating circuit splits when possible"); see also United States v. Games-Perez, 695 F.3d 1104, 1115 (10th Cir. 2012) (Murphy, J., concurring in denial of rehearing en banc) ("[T]he circuits have historically been loath to create a split where none exists. . . . The avoidance of unnecessary circuit splits furthers the legitimacy of the judiciary and reduces friction flowing from the application of different rules to similarly situated individuals based solely on their geographic location."). And, once we put aside this purported exception, it is patent under our precedent--especially given Mr. Anderson's concessions--that the district  court correctly employed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in dismissing Mr. Anderson's action.

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