§ 1927 Sanctions Are Imposable for, But Not Limited to, Dilatory Conduct
B. Willis CPA, Inc. v. Public Serv. Co. of Okla., 511 F. App'x 753 (10th Cir. 2013):
Under a heading titled "The District Court Lacked Jurisdiction To Consider a Motion For Sanctions," Aplt. Opening Br. at 17, Mr. Dickson makes several arguments. First, he argues that "Section 1927 targets the vexatious and unreasonable multiplication of proceedings. Sanctions under this section are levied to compensate the victims of dilatory practices." Id. According to Mr. Dickson, he was not dilatory and not subject to sanctions. While it is correct that reach of § 1927 includes dilatory practices, see Hamilton, 519 F.3d at 1206 (recognizing that purpose of a 1980 amendment to the statute was to deter unnecessary delays in litigation), Mr. Dickson has not cited any authority that sanctions can be imposed only for dilatory conduct. To the contrary, we have authorized sanctions for conduct other than delay. See, e.g., Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504 (10th Cir. 1987).
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