Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

Sanctions — Due Process Demands More Specific Notice for Client Than for Lawyer — Bad Faith for Inherent Power Sanctions Is Judged by an Objective Standard

Dial HD, Inc. v. ClearOne Commc’ns, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 19241 (11th Cir. Sept. 18, 2013):

First, we find unavailing Bowers's argument that he did not receive adequate notice of the district court's intent to use its inherent power to impose sanctions. A district court may impose sanctions using its inherent   power "if in the informed discretion of the court . . . the Rules are [not] up to the task." Peer v. Lewis, 606 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). Before imposing sanctions under a district court's inherent powers, the district court must make a finding of bad faith. In re Mroz, 65 F.3d 1567, 1575 (11th Cir. 1995). The court must make specific findings as to the party's conduct that warrants sanctions. In re Porto, 645 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir. 2011) (addressing a bankruptcy court's imposition of sanctions). Bad faith is an objective standard that is met if the party's conduct was objectively reckless, or outside of the bounds of acceptable conduct. Amlong & Amlong, 500 F.3d at 1241 (addressing sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927).

When a court imposes sanctions under its inherent power, "[d]ue process requires that the attorney (or party) be given fair notice that his conduct may warrant sanctions and the reasons why. Notice can come from the party seeking sanctions, from the court, or from both." Mroz, 65 F.3d at 1575 (citation omitted). In the context of Rule 11 sanctions, we've said that "due process will demand more specific notice" for a client than for   an attorney. Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987). The sanctioned party must have an opportunity to respond, orally or in writing, but the district court need not hold a separate hearing before imposing sanctions. Id. "[T]he timing and content of the notice . . . will depend upon an evaluation of all the circumstances and an appropriate accommodation of the competing interests involved." Id. at 1558.

 

Share this article:

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Email

Recent Posts

RICO and Injunctions: (1) State Court Actions Designed to Perpetuate and Monetize a RICO Violation Are Enjoinable under RICO, Even Though They Are Not Themselves Alleged to Be Predicate Acts [Note: Noerr Pennington Applies in RICO Actions] — (2) Although Civil RICO’s Text and Legislative History Fail to Reveal Any Intent to Override the Provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, Arbitrations Are Enjoinable Under the “Effective Vindication” Doctrine Where They Operate As a Prospective Waiver of a Party’s Right to Pursue Statutory RICO Remedies — (3) Arbitration Findings May Be Given Collateral Estoppel Effect in a Civil RICO Action — (4) Injunction of Non-Corrupt State Court Litigations That Furthers a RICO Violation Are Enjoinable Under the Anti-Injunction Act’s “Expressly Authorized” Exception — (5) “The Irreparable Harm Requirement Is The Single Most Important Prerequisite For The Issuance Of A Preliminary Injunction” (Good Quote) — (6) When Injunction Is Based on “Serious Questions on the Merits” Rather Than “Likelihood of Success,” Court May Rely on Unverified Pleadings and Attached Exhibits to Assess the Merits, Unless the Opponent Has Raised Substantial Questions (Here, the Opponent Failed to Request an Evidentiary Hearing) — (7) Whether Amended Pleading Moots An Appeal Turns on Whether It Materially Changes the Substantive Basis for the Appeal — (8) Meaning of “In That” (“Used To Introduce A Statement That Explains Or Gives More Specific Information” About A Prior Statement)

Archives