Johnson v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 21793 (6th Cir. Oct. 18, 2012):
I. Spoilation of Evidence
Before addressing the merits, we turn first to Plaintiffs' claim that the district court erred in refusing to impose sanctions against Defendants for spoilation of evidence. Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled an inference of discriminatory animus or to a directed verdict because Defendants failed to preserve the individual results of the supervisor surveys and thereby purposefully deprived Plaintiffs of valuable information supporting their claims of reverse discrimination.
This Court reviews a district court's decision regarding spoilation of evidence for abuse of discretion. Beaven v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 622 F.3d 540, 553 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Adkins v. Wolever, 554 F.3d 650, 652 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc)). Federal law governs the determination of whether spoilation sanctions are appropriate. Adkins, 554 F.3d at 652. A proper spoliation sanction serves both fairness and punitive functions. Id. To accomplish these goals, a district court has "broad discretion" to order sanctions it deems appropriate, including dismissing the case, granting summary judgment, or imposing an adverse inference based on the lost or destroyed evidence. Id. Recently, this Court articulated a three-part standard for determining whether sanctions are appropriate:
[A] party seeking an adverse inference instruction based on the destruction of evidence must establish (1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed "with a culpable state of mind;" and (3) that the destroyed evidence was "relevant" to the party's claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.
Beaven, 622 F.3d at 553 (quoting Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)).
In applying this three-part standard, we explained that the obligation element is met where a defendant knows evidence might be relevant to future potential litigation. Id. Where, however, there is no notice of potential litigation, there is less cause to believe the evidence was destroyed intentionally or with the intent to cover up incriminating information. See id. Nevertheless, we also noted that the "culpable state of mind" element may be satisfied by showing only that "the evidence was destroyed 'knowingly, even if without intent to breach a duty to preserve it, or negligently.'" Id. (internal citation, brackets, quotations omitted).
In the instant case, Plaintiffs argue that Metro was obligated to preserve the individual survey results scored by each supervisor, in addition to the averaged rollup scores. Plaintiffs cite several regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and pursuant to Title VII that obligate employers to preserve employment "records." See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-8, 2000e-12; 29 C.F.R. § 1602.31. Defendants counter that employers are not required to keep every single piece of paper created during the employment process..., and that the rollup scores were sufficient to satisfy their statutory preservation obligations.
We agree with the district court that Defendants ought to have preserved the individual survey scores. The surveys were part of, and indeed played an integral role in, a significant change to an already controversial promotion system. Whether through formal litigation or otherwise, it was reasonably foreseeable that Defendants would face some sort of challenge to the new promotions system. Defendants should have anticipated that officers who were passed over for promotion might question that decision and that Defendants would need to defend their selections. By deleting the individual surveys, Defendants also deprived the officers of valuable information regarding their individual performance, their likelihood for future promotion, and information that might have been used in litigation. Regardless of whether the rollups were the most efficient way for Serpas to review the survey results, the individual scores had value warranting their preservation beyond his decision-making process.
Furthermore, Defendants were statutorily obligated to preserve the surveys under EEOC and Title VII regulations. The individual surveys are more properly viewed as records in and of themselves, rather than the "rough drafts" or "processes" used to create a final employment record. See id. at 558. Finally, it was technologically and logistically feasible to retain the survey data, and Defendants have provided no convincing explanation for why they failed to do so.
Having determined that Defendants were obligated to preserve the surveys, the next question is whether Defendants destroyed the evidence with requisite culpable state of mind. Plaintiffs contend that this element is satisfied because the records were destroyed "knowingly" or "negligently" even if the Chief acted "without [the specific] intent to breach [his] duty" to preserve. See Beaven, 622 F.3d at 553. The district court rejected this argument, reasoning that Plaintiffs could not show that Serpas "acted in bad faith." Johnson III, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87866, 2010 WL 3342211, at *19.
The district court erred by injecting a bad faith component into its spoilation analysis. In Adkins, we recognized that there may be a "continuum of fault ranging from innocence through the degrees of negligence to intentionality." 554 F.3d at 652-63. To the extent bad faith is relevant in a spoilation decision, its most appropriately taken into consideration when adjusting the sanction imposed. In the instant case, the record shows that Serpas deliberately chose not to preserve the results and deliberately ordered the destruction of the individual surveys. Although there is no evidence to show that he acted out of bad faith, his conduct was nevertheless intentional and therefore meets the "culpable state of mind" element.
Finally, Plaintiffs must prove that the destroyed surveys are "relevant" to their claims of reverse discrimination. This, however, is where Plaintiffs' request for sanctions must fail. The information Plaintiffs wishes was preserved is of minimal relevance to proving their case for reverse discrimination. First, the surveys themselves were a rather blunt instrument for measuring the supervisors' opinions. The individual results would have consisted only of a string of each supervisor's scoring, rated on a simple 1-to-3 scale, based on instructions which asked the supervisors to take into account a host of qualities demonstrating promotional readiness. The instructions did not tell the supervisors to consider race, gender, or diversity, and to the extent that such motives improperly influenced the scores, they likely would not be immediately apparent from the surveys' simplistic numerical system.
In order to link discriminatory intent to the surveys, Plaintiffs would have to examine each supervisor's rankings for patterns of race or gender discrimination. However, the record does not indicate that the program was enabled in such a way as to accomplish this. Although the supervisors used a log-in "name" and password to access the surveys, the record is unclear as to whether the supervisor's identity was saved alongside with the survey results. Moreover, even if that information was available, multiple inferences would be required to connect the individual surveys relevancy to Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs would need to demonstrate not only an individual supervisor's pattern of discrimination, but also that the pattern of discrimination adversely affected the aggrieved candidate's averaged scores in comparison to his minority counterparts, and by consequence, Serpas' evaluation of the rollup scores. These serious hurdles attenuate the surveys from the ultimate promotion decision at multiple levels. As the proximate causation of the surveys weakens, so does their relevance. Moreover, as we mentioned above, Plaintiffs scored significantly below their promoted counterparts on the supervisor surveys. Accordingly, the likelihood that one or several supervisors' improper discrimination materially altered Plaintiffs' rollup scores is even less likely. The only other way Plaintiffs can conceivably prove the surveys' relevance is by claiming that the rollups were fabricated. Plaintiffs do not seriously press this argument.
Consequently, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying sanctions.
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