Standard for Recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455

Kolon Indus. v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21655 (E.D. Va. Feb. 21, 2012):

In Liljeberg, the Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's "construction of § 455(a)," finding that a violation of the statute "is established when a reasonable person, knowing the relevant facts, would expect that a justice, judge, or magistrate knew of circumstances creating an appearance of partiality." Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 850. Thus, § 455(a) applies to those situations where a "reasonable person" would believe that the judge actually knew about the disqualifying interest at issue.

Footnote 24. See also Chase Manhattan Bank v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 120, 132 (2d Cir. 2003) (examining whether "a reasonable person would believe that the district judge knew he had a financial interest in a party to the litigation at some point before the decision on the merits" to determine whether there was a violation of § 455(a)); Davis v. Xerox, 811 F.2d 1293, 1296 (9th Cir. 1987) ("[I]f a rea-sonable person would conclude from all the circumstances that the judge did not have knowledge at the time he sat, his rulings stand.").

"The determination of whether such an appearance has been created is an objective one based on what a reasonable person knowing all the facts would conclude." Chase Manhattan, 343 F.3d 127 (citing Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 860-61). The analysis assumes that a reasonable person not only knows all the relevant facts, but also understands them. See Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 460 (7th Cir. 1985). In weighing recusal, the trial judge must carefully weigh the policy of promoting public confidence in the judiciary against the pos-sibility that those questioning his impartiality simply might be trying to avoid what they apprehend may be an adverse ruling. See In re United States, 666 F.2d 690, 695 (1st Cir. 1981).

The general standard set out in § 455(a) "is not intended to be an invitation for judges freely to disqualify themselves whenever their impartiality is questioned on any ground." Hauptman v. Wilentz, 555 F. Supp. 28, 31 (D. N.J. 1982). As one expert on disqualification put it in hearings on the bill that became § 455(a):

I want to make loud and clear for purposes of this record, because I assume that this record may have importance for many, many years in the future, that this does not mean that judges are going to be casually getting off the bench or that somebody can march up to a judge and say, 'Well, I just don't feel comfortable with you. I wish you would go away. I question your impartiality.' This is not to happen at all.

Hearings on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. On Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. On the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 (1974) (remarks of John P. Frank, Esq., Phoenix, Arizona, author of Disqualification of Judges: In Support of the Bayh Bill, 35 Law & Contemp. Prob. 43 (1970); Disqualification of Judges, 56 Yale L.J. 605 (1949); Commentary on Disqualification of Judges, 1972 Utah L.Rev. 377).

Another expert observed at the same hearing:

[T]he longer the judge is on the bench, the less the likelihood that the general standard [of Canon 3(c)(1), which became 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)] will require his disqualification because of his former association [as former partner or former associate with a lawyer appearing before him].

Hearing on S. 1064 Before the Subcomm. On Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 93rd Cong. 1st Sess. 100 (1973) (remarks of Professor E. Wayne Thode, reporter for the ABA Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct).

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