Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

Factors for Determining Whether a Current Decision Should Be Given Retroactive Effect in a Civil Case

From Graff v. Town of Pembroke, NH, 447 B.R. 51, 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 783 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2011):

Federal courts traditionally looked to three factors in determining whether a current decision in a civil case should be given retroactive effect or only apply prospectively. Those factors are: (1) whether the more recent rule or decision establishes a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) whether, given the history, purpose and effect of the new rule, retroactive application of the rule will further or retard its operation; and (3) whether retroactive application of the new rule could produce substantial inequitable results. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87-88, 102 S. Ct. 2858, 73 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1982) (citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S. Ct. 349, 30 L. Ed. 2d 296 (1971)). The standard in Chevron has evolved in a number of ways which leave little clarity for courts to follow. Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mersmann (In re Mersmann), 505 F.3d 1033, 1051 (10th Cir. 2007). Chevron has been described as being overruled by the decision in Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Tax'n, 509 U.S. 86, 97, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 125 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1993). Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749, 752, 115 S. Ct. 1745, 131 L. Ed. 2d 820 (1995); Mills v. Maine, 118 F.3d 37, 49 (1st Cir. 1997). The application of a federal law to a particular case does not turn on "whether litigants actually relied on an old rule or how they would suffer from retroactive application of a new one." Mersmann, 505 F.3d at 1051-52 (citing Harper, 509 U.S. at 95 n.9). However, equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdiction. Mersmann, 505 F.3d at 1052; In re Jarvis, 53 F.3d 416, 419 (1st Cir. 1995) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 389, 113 S. Ct. 1489, 123 L. Ed. 2d 74 (1993)); In re Smith Corset Shops, Inc., 696 F.2d 971, 976 (1st Cir. 1982) (citing Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 87 S. Ct. 274, 17 L. Ed. 2d 197 (1966)).

Share this article:

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Email

Recent Posts

RICO and Injunctions: (1) State Court Actions Designed to Perpetuate and Monetize a RICO Violation Are Enjoinable under RICO, Even Though They Are Not Themselves Alleged to Be Predicate Acts [Note: Noerr Pennington Applies in RICO Actions] — (2) Although Civil RICO’s Text and Legislative History Fail to Reveal Any Intent to Override the Provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act, Arbitrations Are Enjoinable Under the “Effective Vindication” Doctrine Where They Operate As a Prospective Waiver of a Party’s Right to Pursue Statutory RICO Remedies — (3) Arbitration Findings May Be Given Collateral Estoppel Effect in a Civil RICO Action — (4) Injunction of Non-Corrupt State Court Litigations That Furthers a RICO Violation Are Enjoinable Under the Anti-Injunction Act’s “Expressly Authorized” Exception — (5) “The Irreparable Harm Requirement Is The Single Most Important Prerequisite For The Issuance Of A Preliminary Injunction” (Good Quote) — (6) When Injunction Is Based on “Serious Questions on the Merits” Rather Than “Likelihood of Success,” Court May Rely on Unverified Pleadings and Attached Exhibits to Assess the Merits, Unless the Opponent Has Raised Substantial Questions (Here, the Opponent Failed to Request an Evidentiary Hearing) — (7) Whether Amended Pleading Moots An Appeal Turns on Whether It Materially Changes the Substantive Basis for the Appeal — (8) Meaning of “In That” (“Used To Introduce A Statement That Explains Or Gives More Specific Information” About A Prior Statement)

Archives