New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.

Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.
Commercial Litigation and Arbitration
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Experts — Lack of Certification in Field Not Disqualifying — Expert’s Failure to Remember Every Document Reviewed Irrelevant, As Is Mistaken Understanding of Relevant Dates — Good Quote

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From GE Capital Corp. v. Nichols, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46095 (D. Conn. April 29, 2011):

As an initial matter, Bodeker appears well-qualified to render an opinion in this case. He has spent sixteen years in the concrete pumping industry, primarily in sales but also in marketing. *** Bodeker has sold or supervised the sale of over 1000 concrete pumps.... He has trained at a sales and service school operated by Schwing (the manufacturer of the concrete pumps in question), and he has managed as many as thirteen different concrete pump stores. ***

General Electric makes much of the fact that Bodeker is not a certified appraiser and not aware of the Uniform Standard of Professional Appraisers Practice.... While such credentials might well lend weight to his assessment, the court finds that Bodeker's substantial sales experience in the relevant industry is more than sufficient to qualify him to testify as to the valuation of the concrete pumps in question. See, e.g., In re Maple, No. 07-10820, 2008 WL 3539793, at *6 (Bankr. D. Vt. Aug. 8, 2008) ("Mr. Lebeau's experience in selling mobile homes--in particular, those built by the same company that manufactured Debtor's home-- . . . qualifies him to opine on the most reasonable sale price for the Debtor's mobile home.").

***General Electric argues that Bodeker lacked a factual basis for his Report.... The court disagrees***.

Bodeker had a sufficient factual basis to support his conclusions. He reviewed a large number of the relevant documents in this litigation, including invoices, sales reports, inspection documents, photographs, and relevant depositions. *** Bodeker's failure to recall at his deposition every document that he reviewed in preparing his Report is neither surprising nor does it cause the court to question the competency of his assessment. The one time that Bodeker stated that he definitely did not review a specific document (the Remarketing Agreement between General Electric and Value Centers), he stated that it was unnecessary for his analysis. ***

Bodeker's mistaken understanding with respect to the relevant dates is also insufficient for this court to question the rigor of his opinion. The difference between the five weeks disparaged in Bodeker's Report and the seven to nine week period discussed by General Electric is marginal. There is no indication within the Report or the portions of Bodeker's Deposition cited by the parties to indicate that Bodeker's view would be any different had he considered the slightly longer period of time.***

"'[A] judge should only exclude evidence if [a] flaw is large enough that the expert lacks "good grounds" for his or her conclusions.'" Amorgianos, 303 F.3d at 267 (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)). This approach is consistent with "the liberal admissibility standard of the federal rules." Id. To the extent General Electric's arguments identify gaps or inconsistencies in Bodeker's Report, they are appropriately addressed at cross examination. See SR Int'l Bus. Ins., 467 F.3d at 134 ("'[T]he weight of the evidence is a matter to be argued to the trier of fact . . . .'" (quoting Campbell v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 239 F.3d 179, 186 (2d Cir. 2001) (first alteration in original)).

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New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.
New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.

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