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Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.
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Plaintiff’s PSLRA Notice of Pendency of Class Action — Which Must Identify “Claims Asserted” — Must List All Federal Securities, but Not All State Law, Claims

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From Poptech, LP v. Stewardship Inv. Advisors, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114711 (D. Conn. Oct. 28, 2010):

Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff Poptech, LP's ("Poptech's") Motion for Appointment as Lead Plaintiff and to Approve Its Selection of Lead Counsel . . . . In the motion, Poptech seeks to be appointed as co-Lead Plaintiff along with William A. Meyer and Dr. Terrence Isakov, and seeks to have Shepherd, Finkelman, Miller & Shaw, LLP approved as Lead Counsel. No other potential Lead Plaintiff has opposed Poptech's motion. However, Defendants Stewardship Investment Advisors, LLC ("Stewardship Advisors") and Marlon Quan filed a Memorandum in Opposition . . . to the pending motion challenging the sufficiency of the notice that Poptech published advising members of the proposed class about the pendency of this action. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A). ***

The PSLRA requires that a notice inform members of the proposed class of "the claims asserted" in the action. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i)(I). ***

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Second Circuit has ever considered whether the PSLRA requires a plaintiff's notice to provide a detailed account of all of the claims in the complaint, including state law claims. Considering that question as a matter of first impression, this Court concludes that the PSLRA does require a notice to list all federal securities law claims, but does not require notice of every state law claim. The PSLRA does not specifically distinguish between federal securities law claims and other claims such as state law claims. However, because the PSLRA applies only to class actions that arise under federal securities law, see id. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(1), the Court believes that the primary purpose of a PSLRA notice is to inform potential class members about the federal securities law claims in the complaint.

The plain text of the PSLRA does not explicitly require a plaintiff to list every claim asserted in a private securities class action. Instead, it requires only that a plaintiff publish a "notice" of "the claims asserted" in a pending securities class action. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(A)(i)(I). Absent indications to the contrary, this Court must presume that Congress uses language in statutes — including the PSLRA — consistent with ordinary usage. See, e.g., Boyle v. United States, U.S. , 129 S. Ct. 2239, 2244 (2009). In ordinary usage, "notice" means nothing more than "an announcement or intimation of something impending; warning." Random House Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 1326 (2d ed. 2001). And as a general legal matter, whether a particular announcement sufficiently informs interested persons of impending action is generally a contextual inquiry. See Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (holding that to comport with due process, "notice [must be] reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections"); Black's Law Dictionary 1164 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "due notice" as notice that is "adequate given the particular circumstances").

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New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.
New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.

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