Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

§ 1746 Declaration = “Affidavit” within Rule 56 — If Lacking Statutory Language, It Is Inadmissible on Summary Judgment

From Kelly v. U.S. Bank, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110127 (D. Or. July 30, 2010):

U.S. Bank objects that this declaration is inadmissible because it was unsworn. The court agrees that the declaration is inadmissible.... An affidavit is, by definition, a statement taken under oath. See Black's Law Dictionary 66 (9th ed. 2009) (defining affidavit as "[a] voluntary declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant before an officer authorized to administer oaths."). As this court wrote previously with respect to the swearing of declarations:

While Rule 56 refers specifically to affidavits, a party may also offer unsworn declarations in support of a motion for summary judgment provided the declarations comply with the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Section 1746 requires that an unsworn declaration executed within the United States include language that "I declare (or certify, verify, or state) under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct," as well as the date on which the declaration was executed.

Kesey v. Francis, No. CV. 06-540-AC, 2009 WL 909530, at *6 (D. Or. Apr. 3, 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1746 (2007)).

The Stark Declaration includes no language indicating that it was made under penalty of perjury or otherwise attesting to its truth and, thus, is inadmissible.

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