Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

NFL Ticket Merely Affords Holder Right to View Game, Not Right to See Honest One — Patriots’ Spygate Scandal Causes No Cognizable Injury

From Mayer v. Belichick, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 10212 (3d Cir. May 19, 2010):

2. This case is brought by a New York Jets season ticket-holder on behalf of all similarly situated New York Jets season ticket-holders and other New York Jets ticket-holders against the Defendant New England Patriots and their coach, Defendant Bill Belichick. The core of this action is that the Defendants, during a game with the New York Jets on September 9, 2007, instructed an agent of the Defendants to surreptitiously videotape the New York Jets coaches and players on the field with the purpose of illegally recording, capturing and stealing the New York Jets signals and visual coaching instructions. The Defendants were in fact subsequently found by the National Football League ("NFL") to have improperly engaged in such conduct. This violated the contractual expectations and rights of New York Jets ticket-holders who fully anticipated and contracted for a ticket to observe an honest match played in compliance with all laws, regulations and NFL rules.

3. Plaintiffs contend that in purchasing tickets to watch the New York Jets that, as a matter of contract, the tickets imply that each game will be played in accordance with NFL rules and regulations as well as all applicable federal and state laws. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants tortuously [sic] interfered with their contractual relations with the New York Jets in purchasing the tickets. They further claim that Defendants violated the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and the New Jersey Deceptive Business Practices Act. Plaintiffs also claim that the Defendants violated federal and state racketeering laws by using the National Football League as an enterprise to carry out their illegal scheme. Because the Defendants have been found in other games to have illegally used video equipment, this action seeks damages for New York Jets ticket-holders for all games played in Giants stadium between the New York Jets and the New England Patriots since Bill Belichick became head coach in 2000. ***

At their most fundamental level, the various claims alleged here arose out of the repeated and surreptitious violations of a specific NFL rule. This rule provides that "'no video recording devices of any kind are permitted to be in use in the coaches' booth, on the field, or in the locker room during the game'" and that "all video for coaching purposes must be shot from locations 'enclosed on all sides with a roof overhead.'" *** In a September 6, 2007 memorandum, Ray Anderson, the NFL's executive vice president of football operations, stated that "'[v]ideotaping of any type, including but not limited to taping of an opponent's offensive or defensive signals, is prohibited on the sidelines, in the coaches' booth, in the locker room, or at any other locations accessible to club staff members during the game.'" ***

The District Court, while noting that Mayer alleged numerous theories of liability in this case, appropriately turned to the following dispositive question: namely, whether or not he stated an actionable injury (or, in other words, a legally protected right or interest) arising out of the alleged "dishonest" videotaping program undertaken by the Patriots and the NFL team's head coach. ***[N]o one in the past has ever brought a legal action quite like this one. However, past cases do, at the very least, provide this Court with certain general legal principles especially relevant to the present matter. Taking into account these principles, the numerous arguments of the parties on appeal, the record on appeal, and the District Court's own ruling, we ultimately conclude that the District Court was correct to hold that Mayer failed to set forth a legally cognizable right, interest, or injury here. At best, he possessed nothing more than a contractual right to a seat from which to watch an NFL game between the Jets and the Patriots, and this right was clearly honored. More specifically, we predict that the New Jersey Supreme Court would reach the exact same legal conclusion if it were confronted with this appeal. ***

Initially, we consider how tickets to sporting and other entertainment events have been treated in the past. As the District Court recognized, New Jersey has generally followed a so-called "license" approach. In Shubert v. Nixon Amusement Co., 83 N.J.L. 101, 83 A. 369 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1912), the old New Jersey Supreme Court considered a tort action filed by a plaintiff who, together with his friends, was ejected from a theater even though they had already taken their seats.... In considering this action, the court turned to prior case law, especially the Court of Exchequer's leading decision in Wood v. Leadbitter, (1845) 153 Eng. Rep. 351 (Exch.). Relying, inter alia, on this English decision, the Shubert court repeatedly indicated that a ticket provides a patron with nothing more than a revocable license. *** For instance, it quoted, with approval, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's finding "that 'a theater ticket is to be regarded as a mere license, for the revocation of which before the holder has actually been given his seat, and has taken it, the only remedy is in assumpsit for a breach of contract.'" Id. at 370 (quoting Horney v. Nixon, 213 Pa. 20, 61 A. 1088, 1090 (Pa. 1905) ). While referring in passing to the "natural justice or injustice" of the defendant's actions, the New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the well-established "license" rule barred the plaintiff's tort action even though he had already taken his seat in the theater before being asked to leave. ***

It appears that this "license" approach has, for some time, been followed throughout the United States and in other common law jurisdictions throughout the world. For example, the United States Supreme Court, in a decision written by Justice Holmes considering the exclusion from a race track of a ticket-holder suspected of drugging a horse, cited with approval both Leadbitter as well as Shubert itself. Marrone v. Wash. Jockey Club of D.C., 227 U.S. 633, 635, 33 S. Ct. 401, 57 L. Ed. 679 (1913). ***

Although it did not use the specific term "license," the ticket stub provided by the Patriots nevertheless appears consistent with this traditional approach. For example, it unambiguously stated that "[t]his ticket only grants entry into the stadium and a spectator seat for the specified NFL game." ... The stub further made clear that the Jets and the owners of the stadium retain sole discretion to refuse admission or to eject a ticket-holder. Admittedly, the Shubert court in particular made repeated references to the existence of a claim for breach of contract. *** However, it appears that the court was only referring to the patron's right to obtain a refund of the ticket price (and related expenses) because the venue exercised its right to deny entry or expel the patron. Given that Mayer was never barred or expelled from any game at Giants Stadium, much more is needed to establish a cognizable right, interest, or injury than these kinds of inapposite statements.***

Courts across the country have recently struggled to deal with litigation arising out of the often complicated ticket arrangements between teams and their fans. Season ticket-holders accordingly have sued teams, with varying degrees of success, claiming that some action (e.g., moving the team itself to another city) violated either their renewal rights or other rights related to their status as season ticket-holders. [Citations omitted.] ***

Nevertheless, the existing "season ticket" case law ultimately does not really help Mayer. Several of these cases have actually indicated that there may be different and distinct kinds of rights or interests implicated in the season ticket context. For instance, the bankruptcy court in Craig stated "that the conclusion does not follow that, because each single ticket is a revocable license, [the team] can either deny Trustee's request to transfer his season ticket status or refuse to recognize that status in his transferees." Craig, 138 B.R. at 494. On the contrary, the Craig court expressly recognized that "[t]he game tickets themselves and the right to renew the season tickets are two separate and distinct interests of this estate." ... We are not concerned here with the relatively more straight-forward issue of renewal rights. Reduced to its essence, the current appeal before us is concerned with the alleged existence of a very specific but very different and unusual right: namely, the right of a ticket-holder to see an "honest" game played in compliance with the fundamental rules of the NFL itself (which was then allegedly denied to Mayer and his fellow ticket-holders because of the secret and illicit videotaping program undertaken by the Patriots and Belichick). ***

Mayer possessed either a license or, at best, a contractual right to enter Giants Stadium and to have a seat from which to watch a professional football game. In the clear language of the ticket stub, "[t]his ticket only grants entry into the stadium and a spectator seat for the specified NFL game." *** Mayer actually was allowed to enter the stadium and witnessed the "specified NFL game[s]" between the Jets and Patriots. He thereby suffered no cognizable injury to a legally protected right or interest.

Accordingly, we need not, and do not decide, whether a ticket-holder possesses nothing more than a license to enter and view whatever event, if any, happens to transpire. Here, Mayer undeniably saw football games played by two NFL teams. This therefore is not a case where, for example, the game or games were cancelled, strike replacement players were used, or the professional football teams themselves did something nonsensical or absurd, such as deciding to play basketball. ***

Furthermore, we do recognize that Mayer alleged that he was the victim, not of mere poor performance by a team or its players, but of a team's ongoing acts of dishonesty or cheating in violation of the express rules of the game. Nevertheless, there are any number of often complicated rules and standards applicable to a variety of sports, including professional football. It appears uncontested that players often commit intentional rule infractions in order to obtain an advantage over the course of the game. For instance, a football player may purposefully commit pass interference or a "delay of game." Such infractions, if not called by the referees, may even change the outcome of the game itself. There are also rules governing the off-field conduct of the football team, such as salary "caps" and the prohibition against "tampering" with the employer-employee relationships between another team and its players and coaches. Mayer further does not appear to contest the fact that a team is evidently permitted by the rules to engage in a wide variety of arguably "dishonest" conduct to uncover an opponent's signals. For example, a team is apparently free to take advantage of the knowledge that a newly hired player or coach takes with him after leaving his former team, and it may even have personnel on the sidelines who try to pick up the opposing team's signals with the assistance of lip-reading, binoculars, note-taking, and other devices. In addition, even Mayer acknowledged in his amended complaint that "[t]eams are allowed to have a limited number of their own videographers on the sideline during the game." ***

In conclusion, this Court will affirm the dismissal of Mayer's amended complaint. Again, it bears repeating that our reasoning here is limited to the unusual and even unique circumstances presented by this appeal. We do not condone the conduct on the part of the Patriots and the team's head coach, and we likewise refrain from assessing whether the NFL's sanctions (and its alleged destruction of the videotapes themselves) were otherwise appropriate. We further recognize that professional football, like other professional sports, is a multi-billion dollar business. In turn, ticket-holders and other fans may have legitimate issues with the manner in which they are treated. *** Significantly, our ruling also does not leave Mayer and other ticket-holders without any recourse. Instead, fans could speak out against the Patriots, their coach, and the NFL itself. In fact, they could even go so far as to refuse to purchase tickets or NFL-related merchandise. *** However, the one thing they cannot do is bring a legal action in a court of law.

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