Rule 41(b) Does Not Preclude Inherent Power Sanctions for Failure to Prosecute
From Scott v. Knight, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25610 (S.D. Ala. Feb. 22, 2010):
Due to Plaintiff's failure to comply with the Court's Order and to prosecute this action, it appears that Plaintiff has abandoned his action thereby subjecting it to dismissal pursuant to the Court's inherent powers. Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 1389-90, 8 L.Ed.2d 112 (1962) ("The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of prosecution has generally been considered an 'inherent power' governed not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieved the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases."); Zocaras v. Castro, 465 F.3d 479, 483 (11th Cir.) (recognizing a district court's inherent power to enforce orders and provide for the efficient disposition of litigation), cert denied, 549 U.S. 1228 (2007); Wilson v. Sargent, 313 F.3d 1315, 1331-32 & n.7 (11th Cir. 2002) (indicating that a prisoner's failure to pay the partial filing fee under § 1915 is a basis for dismissal).
This inherent power is not restricted by Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which also authorizes the dismissal of an action as a sanction where there is "a clear record of willful conduct and a finding that lesser sanctions are inadequate." Zocaras, 465 F.3d at 483; see generally Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337-38 (11th Cir. 2005) (discussing dismissals pursuant to the court's inherent power and dismissals based on Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and concluding that a dismissal with prejudice requires findings of contumacious conduct and that lesser sanctions will not suffice).
Thus, this action may be dismissed under Rule 41(b) as well because Plaintiff's conduct of failing to respond to the Court's Order, after previously notifying the Court of his "free world" address where the Court's Order was sent and was not returned by postal authorities, is willful conduct warranting the imposition of sanctions. In considering the sanctions that will address this conduct, and in light of the facts that Plaintiff filed twenty-four actions from July 15, 2009, to December 10, 2009, while he was a prisoner and that after his release from prison his situation more than likely is impecunious, a sanction less than dismissal would not address Plaintiff's conduct and be effective. Malautea v. Suzki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding that bad faith and intransigence could not be remedied by a sanction less than dismissal or default judgment). Accordingly, it is recommended that this action be dismissed without prejudice.
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