From United States v. Duran-Moreno, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47150 (D.N.M. April 20, 2009):

The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has held that rule 404(b)'s prohibition applies to a defendant who wishes to introduce evidence of wrongdoing by another to establish his innocence. See United States v. Puckett, 692 F.2d 663, 671 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091, 103 S. Ct. 579, 74 L. Ed. 2d 939 (1982). ***[Co-Defendant] Mauzy argued that rule 404(b) did not govern the admissibility of the evidence because he contended that it did not apply "to situations in which a defendant wishes to introduce evidence of wrongdoing by another person in order to establish his own innocence." ... The Tenth Circuit indicated that it was "not inclined to interpret [rule 404(b)] so narrowly." ... The Tenth Circuit explained that its review of the "Advisory Committee Notes on the Proposed Rules [of Evidence] indicate[d] that the members of the committee were concerned not only with the prejudicial impact to a defendant in admission of extrinsic acts as evidence, but also with its limited probative value." ... The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court properly rejected the evidence as irrelevant, "[p]articularly . . . [where] the evidence offered by Mauzy pertained to activities by [his co-conspirator that were] unrelated and dissimilar to the charges alleged in the indictment." ....

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Since United States v. Puckett, the Tenth Circuit has considered the admissibility of prior acts proffered by the defendant, often referred to as "reverse 404(b)" evidence. ***

In Agushi v. Duerr, 196 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 1999), the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit decided, as a matter of first impression, that rule 404(b) applied to acts of third parties.... The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by noting that "[r]ule 404(b) speaks not of the parties to a case but of a 'person.'" ... The Seventh Circuit noted that "[e]vidence regarding other crimes is admissible for defensive purposes if it 'tends, alone or with other evidence, to negate [the defendant's] guilt of the crime charged against him.'" ... The Seventh Circuit explained that, although Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S. Ct. 1496, 99 L. Ed. 2d 771 (1988), "involved a situation in which the defendant was the actor, the Court strongly suggested that Rule 404(b) should be applied to any actor." ... The Seventh Circuit concluded that, "[b]ased on the Supreme Court's guidance, our sister circuit's reasoning . . . as well as the very language contained in Rule 404(b), we hold that Rule 404(b) does apply to third parties." ...

In 2005, the Seventh Circuit, however, disagreed with a district court's evidentiary ruling that held the [criminal] defense to as rigorous a 404(b) standard as the United States. See United States v. Seals, 419 F.3d 600, 607 (7th Cir. 2005)("Contrary to the district court's statement, the defense is not held to as rigorous of a standard as the government in introducing reverse 404(b) evidence.").... The Seventh Circuit, however, affirmed the district court's decision to exclude the proffered evidence because it was irrelevant and inadmissible.... It noted that the similarities between the charged conduct and the previous incident were generic, because the underlying facts were dissimilar.... The Seventh Circuit explained that, although "the legal standard for admitting reverse 404(b) evidence is relatively lenient, the evidence still must be relevant."....

In United States v. McCourt, 925 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1991), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized that rule 404(b) makes no distinction between defendants and third parties in excluding prior-acts evidence to show criminal propensity or as a basis for suggesting the inference that certain conduct was in conformity with it. ***

Motion to exclude reverse 404(b) evidence denied.