Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

RICO — Nationwide Jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 1965 — Circuit Split

The plaintiff in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Plambeck, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10302 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2009), brought this civil RICO action against chiropractors who allegedly submitted fraudulent bills and attorneys allegedly involved in the fraudulent scheme. Only one defendant resided in the district:

Most courts have interpreted [18 U.S.C.] section 1965(b) to confer nationwide jurisdiction in a RICO action over nonresident defendants if the plaintiff can establish personal jurisdiction over at least one defendant under section 1965(a). See Rolls-Royce Corp. v. Heros, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d 765, 778-79 (N.D. Tex. 2008) (citing cases); Oblio Telecom, Inc. v. Patel, No. 3-08-CV-0279-L, 2008 WL 4936488 at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2008) (citing cases). Stated differently, if a RICO plaintiff can show that at least one defendant "resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs" in the forum, then jurisdiction is proper as to all other defendants if "the ends of justice require." Rolls-Royce, 576 F.Supp.2d at 779; Paolino v. Argyll Equities, L.L.C., 401 F.Supp.2d 712, 718 (W.D. Tex. 2005). Due process in such cases is satisfied if the nonresident defendant has sufficient minimum contacts with the United States. See Busch, 11 F.3d at 1258; Rolls-Royce, 576 F.Supp.2d at 782.

[Footnote 2 — Circuit Split.] A circuit split has developed on the issue of which subsection of the RICO statute grants nationwide jurisdiction. The Second, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have determined that subsection 1965(b) confers nationwide service of process in RICO cases. See PT United Can Co. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 138 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1998); Lisak v. Mercantile Bancorp, Inc., 834 F.2d 668, 671 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 1472 (1988); Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Investments, Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 539-39 (9th Cir. 1986); Cory v. Aztec Steel Building, Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 2134 (2007). The Fourth and Eleventh Circuits have held that section 1965(d) is the relevant subsection. See ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc. , 126 F.3d 617, 626-27 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1364 (1998); Republic of Panama v. BCCI Holdings, 119 F.3d 935, 942 (11th Cir. 1997). Although the Fifth Circuit has not yet decided the issue, most federal courts in Texas, including two judges in this district, have followed the majority rule. See Rolls-Royce Corp. v. Heros, Inc., 576 F.Supp.2d 765, 779 (N.D. Tex. 2008); Oblio Telecom, Inc. v. Patel, No. 3-08-CV-0279-L, 2008 WL 4936488 at *4 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 18, 2008); Hawkins v. The Upjohn Co., 890 F.Supp. 601, 605-06 (E.D.Tex. 1994).

It is undisputed that Michael Kent Plambeck, the alleged mastermind of the RICO conspiracy, resides in the Northern District of Texas, and that 17 of his CSG clinics are located in this district. Nor is there any dispute that the Magelaner Defendants, who represent accident victims in Ohio and occasionally in Indiana, have minimum contacts with the United States. Therefore, the court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Magelaner Defendants under section 1965(b) if "the ends of justice require."

[“Ends of Justice.”] "[T]he 'ends of justice' is a flexible concept uniquely tailored to the facts of each case." Cory v. Aztec Steel Building, Inc., 468 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 2134 (2007). In a RICO action, the "ends of justice" require nationwide service of process to further the Congressional intent of allowing "plaintiffs to bring all members of a nationwide [ ] conspiracy before a court in a single trial." Butcher's Union Local No. 498 v. SDC Investments, Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir. 1986), citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 17, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 1078, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963); accord Johnson v. Investacorp, Inc., No. 3-89-CV-2607-H, 1990 WL 25034 at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 1990). Nationwide service of process also promotes the "ends of justice" where, as here, numerous defendants reside in different states, and there likely is no alternative forum in which jurisdiction would be proper as to all defendants. See Johnson, 1990 WL 25034 at *2 (exercise of nationwide jurisdiction under section 1965 was appropriate where at least three defendants were Texas residents and other defendants resided in such diverse locales as Florida, California, Illinois, Missouri, and Colorado); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Byd:Sign, Inc. , No. 6-05-CV-456, 2006 WL 2822151 at *10 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2006).

While recognizing that the RICO statute authorizes nationwide service of process, the Magelaner Defendants [attorney defendants] argue that the "ends of justice" do not require that they be brought before the court because plaintiffs have failed to "plead with particularity overt acts within the forum taken in furtherance of the conspiracy." ... This argument misses the mark. There is no requirement that a plaintiff plead or prove that a nonresident defendant committed an overt act within the forum in furtherance of a RICO conspiracy. All that is required is for the plaintiff to show that at least one defendant "resides, is found, has an agent, or transacts his affairs" in the district, that the nonresident defendant has minimum contacts with the United States, and that "the ends of justice" require the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident. ***

The Magelaner Defendants also suggest that the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not comport with the constitutional requirement of due process. ... "While the expansive minimum contacts test under a nationwide service of process provision does not obviate due process concerns, the Fifth Circuit has [ ] held that, in the context of a nationwide service of process provision, 'it does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant residing within the United States."' Rolls-Royce, 576 F.Supp.2d at 782, quoting Busch, 11 F.3d at 1258.***

[Footnote 3.] Although another Fifth Circuit panel has criticized the Busch test for exercising personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in a nationwide service of process case, see Bellaire General Hospital v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan, 97 F.3d 822, 826 (5th Cir. 1996), Busch has never been overruled and has been consistently followed by district courts within the circuit. See Rolls-Royce, 576 F.Supp.2d at 782.

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