New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.

Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.
Commercial Litigation and Arbitration
« Back to Complex Lit Blog

Arbitration — Order of Priority of the Federal Arbitration Act, New York Convention and Inter-American Convention (Chapters 1, 2 and 3 of Title 9)

Download PDF

From RZS Holdings AVV v. PDVSA Petroleos S.A., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47126 (E.D. Va. Feb. 5, 2009):

The Court holds that the terms and provisions of the Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration ("the Inter-American Convention" or "Chapter Three") govern this arbitral award, and not Chapter One of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA" or "Chapter One") because this is an international arbitration, the parties are citizens of countries that are signatories of the Convention, and there is a conflict between the provisions of the Chapter One and Chapter Three and in the event of such a conflict, the terms of Chapter Three govern. International arbitral awards are governed by 9 U.S.C. §§201-208 ("the New York Convention" or "Chapter Two") and 9 U.S.C. §§301-307 ("the Inter-American Convention" or "Chapter Three"). When the requirements for the application of both Conventions are met, "[i]f a majority of the parties to the arbitration agreement are citizens of a State or States that have ratified or acceded to the Inter-American Convention, and are member States of the Organization of American States, the Inter-American Convention shall apply." 9 U.S.C. §305(1). Sections 202, 203, 204, 205 and 207 of Title IX are incorporated into the Inter-American Convention by reference. 9 U.S.C. §302. Chapter One is incorporated into Chapter Three to the extent that its provisions are not in conflict with those announced in Chapter Three. 9 U.S.C. §307.

The arbitral award presently before the Court is an international award subject to the provisions of the Inter-American Convention because it is non-domestic in nature, and because both Venezuela and the United States are signatories of the Inter-American Convention. Awards are considered non-domestic and thus governed by one of the Conventions when they are "made within the legal framework of another country, e.g., pronounced in accordance with foreign law or involving parties domiciled or having their principal place of business outside the enforcing jurisdiction." Industrial Risk Insurers v. M.A.N. Gutenhoffnungshutte, 141 F.3d 1434, 1441 (11th Cir. 1998). PDVSA's representation that the arbitration at issue here "was conducted in conformity with the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration located in Paris, France . . . and was governed by English law" is uncontradicted.... Furthermore PDVSA has its principal place of business in Venezuela. Therefore this arbitration, must be designated as international, not domestic, and subjected to the terms of either the New York or Inter-American Convention. As mentioned previously, when the parties to an arbitration are citizens of countries that are signatories of the Inter-American Convention, the terms of the Inter-American Convention govern. RZS was established in the Commonwealth of Virginia, and has its principal place of business therein. As previously noted, PDVSA is established under the laws of Venezuela and has its principal place of business therein. Therefore, for purposes of this analysis, the Court finds RZS to be a citizen of the United States, and PDVSA a citizen of Venezuela. Both countries are signatories of the Inter-American Convention, and therefore it provides the governing framework for this analysis.

Share this article:

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Email

Recent Posts

RICO: (1) Victim vs. Perpetrator Enterprises — (2) § 1962(b): Elements of a Violation — (3) Meaning of “Interest” and “Control” in § 1962(b) — (4) The Defendant in a § 1962(b) Action Need Not Be an Enterprise; The Victim Must Be An Enterprise — (5) Acquisition/Maintenance Injury Required (6) Aiding and Abetting Liability under RICO

Rule 11 Sanctions: Request for Bill of Particulars re Sanctions Proceeding Reviewed for Abuse of Discretion — Court’s Discretion Narrows As Severity of Sanction Increases OR When It Initiates the Sanction Proceeding Itself — Particularly Strict Abuse of Discretion Standard Applied — “Rule 11 Does Not License a District Court to Sanction Any Action by an Attorney or Party That It Disapproves of” (Good Quote) — Failure to Provide Identify Specific Pleading and Detail Specific, Objectionable Conduct within that Pleading Violates Due Process — Failure to Provide Notice That Most Severe Sanction May Be Imposed Violates Due Process — Failure to Provide Notice That “Scarlett Letter Sanction” (Mandatory Circulation of Sanctions Order) Or Other Sanction That Could Leave Indelible Imprint on Career Might Be Imposed Violates Due Process — Notice That Law Firm Might Be Sanctioned Insufficient to Afford Notice to Firm Lawyer and Managing Partner That He Might Be Sanctioned — Refusal to Impose Additional Sanction Until Impact of Other Imposed Penalties (Not Sanctions) Ascertained to See Whether Sanction Needed

Rule 37(c)(1) Sanctions: (1) Exclusion of Expert Testimony Reviewed for Abuse of Discretion Even When It Results in Summary Judgment — (2) Whether Physicians Must File 26(a)(2)(B) Report Depends on Whether They Formed Their Opinions for Litigation Or in the Course of Medical Treatment — (3) Party Seeking to Avoid Exclusion of Its Expert for Noncompliance with Rule 26 Bears Burden of Showing Harmlessness or Substantial Justification — (4) Expert Report Subject to Exclusion If It Is Conclusory and Does Not Meet the Level of Rigor Required by Rule 26(a)(2)(B)

RICO: The Statute Defines Enterprise Broadly, “But That Breadth Is Not Without Limit” (Good Quote) — Enterprise Inadequately Pled Where Plaintiffs Fail to Name the Common Purpose, Explain How the Relationships Among the Defendants Allowed Them to Advance That Purpose, Or Specify the Period of Time Sufficient to Achieve That Purpose — In a Particular Case, the Pattern of Racketeering May Be Sufficient to Infer the Existence of an Association-in-Fact Enterprise, But Pattern Does Not Necessarily Establish Enterprise — A RICO Conspiracy May Exist Regardless of Whether the Substantive RICO Violation Is Consummated, But the Substantive Violation Must Be Adequately Pled

RICO: (1) Claim Accrued When Plaintiff Suffered, and Was Aware of, Her Injury — Overt Retaliation in Her Employment As A Result of Reporting Another Employee’s Sexual Misconduct — Not When a Report Confirming that Misconduct Later Became Public; (2) Inhouse Lawyer’s Conclusion No Sexual Misconduct Occurred Is a Mere Expression of a Legal Conclusion, Not Deception Warranting SOL Reprieve Due to Equitable Tolling or Fraudulent Concealment — Plaintiff Exhibited Lack of Diligence in Failing to Consult Own Counsel or Challenge Inhouse Counsel’s Conclusion; (3) Causation: Plaintiff Must Prove Her Injuries Were Directly Caused by the Predicate Acts — (4) Concealment of Report Commissioned by Employer Directly Harmed Employer (by Exposing It to Liability) and Victims of Sexual Misconduct, and Only Indirectly Harmed Plaintiff Who Suffered Retaliation in Her Employment for Reporting the Misconduct

RICO: Without Injury to Business or Property, Injury Resulting from RICO Violation Is Not Actionable under RICO — Meaning of “Property” in § 1964(c) — Meaning of “Business” in § 1964(c) — Mere “Expectancy Interests” ≠ Business or Property — Loss of NCAA Eligibility = Loss of a Status, Not Loss of Property — Pecuniary Losses (Here, Attorney’s Fees) Flowing from a Non-Cognizable Injury Are Not Recoverably via RICO

RICO: Enterprise Not Sufficiently Distinct from Defendant Where Enterprise Allegedly Consisted of the Defendant Corporation, Corporate Employees, Their Counsel and “Friends”

FRAP 38 Sanctions Should Not Lightly Be Awarded on the Ground That an Incorrect Argument Was Frivolous — “An Appeal Can Be Weak, Indeed Almost Hopeless, Without Being Frivolous” (Good Quote) — There Must Be “No Legitimate Basis for Pursuing the Appeal” (Good Quote)

Severe Emotional Distress and Trauma ≠ RICO Injury — Parents’ Voluntary Financial Support of Adult Daughter Who Was Forced to Sign Over Her Annuity in Violation of RICO Not Proximately Caused by RICO Violation — Injury Is Derivative, Not Direct (Intimation of Different Result if Financial Support Required by Law) — RICO Injury Is Requirement for Statutory Standing (12(b)(6) Issue), Not Constitutional Standing (12(b)(1) Issue)

RICO — Neither Filing a Complaint Nor Issuing a Press Release Constitutes Wire Fraud — Litigation Privilege Is Absolute and Bars All Tort Claims Other Than Malicious Prosecution — Abuse of Process Claim Barred (California Law)

Archives
New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.
New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.

New York Office

© 2024 Joseph Hage Aaronson LLC  
Disclaimer | Attorney Advertising Notice | Legal Notice