From Knight v. J.I.T. Packaging, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96927 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2008):

[T]he crux of the issue ... turns upon whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(d) applies to the removal procedure. Although the courts that have considered the issue are divided, the majority have determined that Rule 6(d) does not extend the thirty-day removal period of section 1446(b). See, e.g., Hammond v. Aetna Health, Inc., No. 6:07-cv-139-Orl-28DAB, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19032, 2007 WL 853751, *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 19, 2007) ("The Courts who [sic] have considered the issue have concluded that Rule 6(e) does not extend the statutory 30-day period for filing a notice of removal."); Daniel v. United Wis. Life Ins. Co. , 84 F. Supp. 2d 1353, 1356 (N.D. Ala. 2000) ("[T]he great majority of courts to consider the issue have concluded that Rule 6(d) does not extend the statutory 30-day period for filing a notice of removal."); Mitchell v. Kentucky-American Water Co. , 178 F.R.D. 140, 142 (E.D. Ky. 1997) ("On this issue of first impression, this Court finds that Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) may not be applied to extend the thirty-day deadline set by the removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)."); Connors v. City of Philadelphia, No. CIV. A. 94-2145, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6596, 1994 WL 198659, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 20, 1994) ("[T]he thirty-day period for removal did not begin to run until after Defendants received the Complaint in the mail. There is no logical reason to add three days to the allotted period."); L & O P'ship NO. 2 v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 761 F. Supp. 549, 550 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ("Rule 6(e)'s three-day extension, however, does not apply to the computation of time in this context. Rather, the thirty-day period begins to run when the initial pleading is actually received by the defendant.") (citation omitted); Skidaway Assoc., Ltd. v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 738 F. Supp. 980, 981 (D. S.C. 1990) ("[Rule 6(e)] does not apply to extend the statutory period for filing a petition for removal.").

Of course, some of the courts that have considered the issue have concluded that Rule 6(d) does extend the thirty-day removal period of 1446(b). See e.g., Moran v. Guardian Auto. Prods., Inc., No. 3:05 CV 7184, 2005 WL 1308879 (N.D. Ohio June 1, 2005) (Applying Rule 6(e) to extend, by three days, the thirty-day removal procedure of section 1446(b)); Hardy v. Square D Co., 199 F. Supp. 2d 676 (N.D. Ohio 2002) (Determining that, when service is effectuated through the mail, Rule 6(e) extends, by three days, the thirty-day period during which a defendant may file a notice of removal in federal court); Grossman v. ABC Appliance, Inc., No. 98-75211, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2786, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 9, 1999) ("[T]he thirty[-]day period outlined in section 1446(b) is extended by three days where service was accomplished through the mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e)."); Orr v. Trina, Inc., No. C 93-4213 SC, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21473, 1994 WL 28028, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 1994) ("The [thirty-day] limitation period [of Section 1446(b)] also must include three days pursuant to F.R.C.P. Rule 6(e) for a total of 33 days.").

Held, unnecessary to weigh in on issue due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction.