New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.

Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.
Commercial Litigation and Arbitration
« Back to Complex Lit Blog

Sanctions — Post-Trial Rule 11 Motion Must Satisfy 21-Day Safe Harbor

Download PDF

The defendant in Saldibar v. Delray One, Inc., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61470 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2008), moved for sanctions after trial on the theory that the plaintiff’s case was doomed to lose at trial. The motion, however, was too late for the plaintiff to correct or withdraw its offending positions because the defendant did not file the motion until after it had won the case. Motion denied for failure to honor safe harbor:

The Eleventh Circuit allows Rule 11 motions to be filed after entry of final judgment. See Baker v. Alderman, 158 F.3d 516, 523 (11th Cir. 1998) ("Rule 11 motions are collateral to an action and are not barred if filed after a dismissal order, or after entry of judgment.") (citations omitted). Although the Eleventh Circuit has not addressed the applicability of the safe harbor period to post-judgment Rule 11 motions, the Seventh Circuit has held that Rule 11 motions filed after entry of a final judgment must still comply with the 21 day safe harbor period. See Divane v. Krull Electric Co., 200 F.3d 1020, 1026 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that Rule 11 motion filed more than 21 days before entry of final judgment satisfied safe harbor requirement). The safe harbor provision still applies even though the instant motion is a "renewed" motion. See Zhu v. Federal Housing Finance Bd., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32398, 2007 WL 675646, *4 (D. Kan., May 1, 2007) (denying renewed motion for Rule 11 sanctions based partly on same conduct as initial motion because renewed motion failed to comply with safe harbor provision). The Court realizes the inconvenience of serving a Rule 11 motion on opposing counsel during the middle of a jury trial, but it has found no authority for the proposition that the 21 day safe harbor period is inapplicable during such time. R.B. Ventures v. Shane, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10170, 2000 WL 1010400, *2 (S.D.N.Y., Jul. 20, 2000) recognized that "a factual account first given at mid-trial, in the presence of the jury, obviously cannot be subjected to the 'safe harbor' curative provision[]" of Rule 11, but R.B. Ventures involved oral trial testimony that did not accord with pre-trial depositions or pleadings. Accordingly, R.B. Ventures distinguished the oral testimony from "pre-trial papers" and exempted the testimony from Rule 11. See id. Here, Plaintiff argued both at trial and in numerous written pre-trial filings that he was entitled to FLSA protection.

Defendant has unquestionably failed to comply with the safe harbor provision of Rule 11. Allowing the motion to proceed in this context would vitiate the safe harbor provision because Plaintiff's counsel had no notice that its position at trial would be the target of a future Rule 11 motion: Defendant's prior Rule 11 motion was denied, and Plaintiff reasonably relied on same at trial.

Share this article:

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Email

Recent Posts

Inherent Power Sanctions — Dismissal for Threatening Defendant and Magistrate Judge — No First Amendment Right to Threaten Violence

RICO: Domestic Injury — Delivery of Fraudulently Non-Conforming Goods FOB Los Angeles for Shipment to China Means Injury Arose Domestically When Purchaser Took Title —Other Relevant Factors Include That The Non-Conforming Goods Were Sourced and Made in the U.S. and The Racketeering Activity (Mail/Wire Fraud) Occurred in, and Was Directed from, the United States — Irrelevant to Domestic Injury Inquiry Whether Property Is Tangible or Intangible — 7th Circuit’s “Injury-Felt” Test of Domestic Injury Rejected by Supreme Court — RICO Standing Requires Concrete Financial Loss, Not Merely Injury to Valuable Intangible Property Interest (9th Circuit)

RICO Causation: Parents of Children with Disabilities Deprived In-Person Education and Services during the Pandemic Were Not Causally Injured by Teachers’ False Assurances to Federal Authorities That IDEA-Complaint Policies Were in Place, Which Caused Funds to Issue But Not to the Benefit of the Disabled Children — Damages Too Indirect — Proper Plaintiff Is U.S. Government — Private Injunctive Relief Under RICO Uncertain in Third Circuit

Sanctions: Rule 37(b)(2) Dismissal — Sixth Circuit Factors

Inherent Power Sanctions — Extrajudicial Misconduct: Sanctions Power Extends to Conduct Intended to Sabotage Court’s Ability to Adjudicate the Case Before It, Here, By Commencing State Court Actions Seeking to Enjoin the Federal Plaintiffs from Proceeding with Their Federal Litigation — Sanctions Fee Awards: The Factors Used For Calculating A Fee Award To A Prevailing Party Do Not Govern — Under Goodyear, the Relevant Inquiry Is Whether There Is A Sufficient Causal Link Between The Sanctioned Misconduct And The Fees Awarded

RICO: Members of Association-in-Fact Enterprise Must Act with a Common Purpose—Mere Allegation That Various Defendants Agreed at Different Times to Engage in Various Fraudulent Schemes Does Not Plausibly Support the Essential Inference, That They Acted with s Sufficiently Common Purpose

RICO Causation: (1) State’s Misrepresentation to Federal Government That It Was Providing Plaintiffs with Mandated Special Education Did Not Cause Plaintiffs’ Injury Because The Failure to Provide The Education Was Not Caused by the Fraud on the Federal Government — (2) The Three Factors for Assessing RICO Causation — (3) Limits of the Second Circuit’s Decision in Alix v. McKinsey That Causation Can Be Established Where A Fraud On The Judiciary “Or Other Governmental Entity” Resulted In A Resource Going To Someone Less Deserving

Rule 41(b): Five Factors to Be Weighed in Deciding Whether Dismissal Is Appropriate (Second Circuit) — Is A Finding of Bad Faith or Fault Required if Dismissal Is Without Prejudice? — Undecided If Truly Without Prejudice But It Is Required If the Without Prejudice Dismissal Will Act as a Dismissal on the Merits (Here, Because of the Statute of Limitations) — Failure To Consider A Lesser Sanction Than Dismissal Is Generally An Abuse Of Discretion

Spoliation Sanctions/Mootness: Stipulation Resolving “All Pending Discovery Disputes,” Which Are Enumerated, Does Not Moot Subsequent Sanctions Motion for ESI Spoliation — Postjudgment Sanctions Order Is Appealable When District Court Has Finally Disposed of Both Liability and Amount

Rule 37 Default Judgment Sanction: (1) Default Judgment Appropriate Only As a Last Resort, When Less Drastic Sanctions Would Not Ensure Compliance with the Court’s Orders — (2) Default Judgment Sanction Requires Willful or Bad Faith Failure to Obey Discovery Order — (3) Fugitive Defendant’s Failure to Appear at Court-Ordered, Remote Deposition Despite Court Warning That Sanctions Could Follow Disobedience Warrants Default Judgment — (4) District Court Afforded Wide Discretion in Interpreting Its Own Orders — (5) Filing a Notice of Appeal from a Non-Appealable Order (Here, a Discovery Order) Does Not Deprive the District Court of Jurisdiction over the Case

Archives
New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.
New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.

New York Office

© 2024 Joseph Hage Aaronson LLC  
Disclaimer | Attorney Advertising Notice | Legal Notice