New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.

Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.
Commercial Litigation and Arbitration
« Back to Complex Lit Blog

Is the Jury’s Attention Spam No Longer than One Commercial Break? Ten-Minute Limit on Opening Statements

Download PDF

From Faulman v. Security Mut. Fin. Life Ins. Co., 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71227 (D.N.J. Sept. 12, 2008), on plaintiffs’ motion for a new trial:

Plaintiffs argue that the Court's decision, after jury selection, to impose a ten-minute limitation on the parties' opening statements, on the basis that "jurors cannot absorb a long speech" (Trial Tr. (sidebar) 5, 6, May 19, 2008), prejudiced Plaintiffs because it "impaired [their] ability to provide the jury with an adequate 'roadmap' of the evidence that would be presented and its significance." ... However, Plaintiffs acknowledge that "trial judges have the inherent authority to control the proceedings before them by setting reasonable time limits for trials." ***

Plaintiffs rely on the Third Circuit's decision in Duquesne Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 609-10 (3d Cir. 1995) for their argument that the Court acted unreasonably in imposing a time limit only on the parties' opening statements, and that the Court should have instead permitted Plaintiffs to control the presentation of the factual and legal issues of their case. There, the district court, in the middle of trial, reversed an earlier pre-trial decision to allot each side 140 hours, and accorded each side 22 days each to present its case. The plaintiff in that action was already 11 days into the presentation of its case when the court made the decision. ....

Here, in contrast, the Court informed the parties of the time limit before trial began, thus avoiding the change in course that occurred in the middle of the Duquesne trial. *** Although Plaintiffs contend that the Court's "concern about the attention span of the jurors was unfounded" (Pls.' Br. 5), the Third Circuit has recognized that "a court's resources are finite and a court must dispose of much litigation," and that time limits may increase the efficiency of trials. Duquesne, 66 F.3d at 609-10. Defendant's opening statement was also limited to ten minutes. Plaintiffs argue vaguely that the time limit impeded their ability to present a roadmap of their evidence, but do not demonstrate how their case was adversely affected by the shorter opening statement. Thus, the Court does not find that its decision to limit both sides to ten minutes for their opening statements constitutes a substantial error that requires a new trial.

Share this article:

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Email

Recent Posts

Inherent Power Sanctions — Dismissal for Threatening Defendant and Magistrate Judge — No First Amendment Right to Threaten Violence

RICO: Domestic Injury — Delivery of Fraudulently Non-Conforming Goods FOB Los Angeles for Shipment to China Means Injury Arose Domestically When Purchaser Took Title —Other Relevant Factors Include That The Non-Conforming Goods Were Sourced and Made in the U.S. and The Racketeering Activity (Mail/Wire Fraud) Occurred in, and Was Directed from, the United States — Irrelevant to Domestic Injury Inquiry Whether Property Is Tangible or Intangible — 7th Circuit’s “Injury-Felt” Test of Domestic Injury Rejected by Supreme Court — RICO Standing Requires Concrete Financial Loss, Not Merely Injury to Valuable Intangible Property Interest (9th Circuit)

RICO Causation: Parents of Children with Disabilities Deprived In-Person Education and Services during the Pandemic Were Not Causally Injured by Teachers’ False Assurances to Federal Authorities That IDEA-Complaint Policies Were in Place, Which Caused Funds to Issue But Not to the Benefit of the Disabled Children — Damages Too Indirect — Proper Plaintiff Is U.S. Government — Private Injunctive Relief Under RICO Uncertain in Third Circuit

Sanctions: Rule 37(b)(2) Dismissal — Sixth Circuit Factors

Inherent Power Sanctions — Extrajudicial Misconduct: Sanctions Power Extends to Conduct Intended to Sabotage Court’s Ability to Adjudicate the Case Before It, Here, By Commencing State Court Actions Seeking to Enjoin the Federal Plaintiffs from Proceeding with Their Federal Litigation — Sanctions Fee Awards: The Factors Used For Calculating A Fee Award To A Prevailing Party Do Not Govern — Under Goodyear, the Relevant Inquiry Is Whether There Is A Sufficient Causal Link Between The Sanctioned Misconduct And The Fees Awarded

RICO: Members of Association-in-Fact Enterprise Must Act with a Common Purpose—Mere Allegation That Various Defendants Agreed at Different Times to Engage in Various Fraudulent Schemes Does Not Plausibly Support the Essential Inference, That They Acted with s Sufficiently Common Purpose

RICO Causation: (1) State’s Misrepresentation to Federal Government That It Was Providing Plaintiffs with Mandated Special Education Did Not Cause Plaintiffs’ Injury Because The Failure to Provide The Education Was Not Caused by the Fraud on the Federal Government — (2) The Three Factors for Assessing RICO Causation — (3) Limits of the Second Circuit’s Decision in Alix v. McKinsey That Causation Can Be Established Where A Fraud On The Judiciary “Or Other Governmental Entity” Resulted In A Resource Going To Someone Less Deserving

Rule 41(b): Five Factors to Be Weighed in Deciding Whether Dismissal Is Appropriate (Second Circuit) — Is A Finding of Bad Faith or Fault Required if Dismissal Is Without Prejudice? — Undecided If Truly Without Prejudice But It Is Required If the Without Prejudice Dismissal Will Act as a Dismissal on the Merits (Here, Because of the Statute of Limitations) — Failure To Consider A Lesser Sanction Than Dismissal Is Generally An Abuse Of Discretion

Spoliation Sanctions/Mootness: Stipulation Resolving “All Pending Discovery Disputes,” Which Are Enumerated, Does Not Moot Subsequent Sanctions Motion for ESI Spoliation — Postjudgment Sanctions Order Is Appealable When District Court Has Finally Disposed of Both Liability and Amount

Rule 37 Default Judgment Sanction: (1) Default Judgment Appropriate Only As a Last Resort, When Less Drastic Sanctions Would Not Ensure Compliance with the Court’s Orders — (2) Default Judgment Sanction Requires Willful or Bad Faith Failure to Obey Discovery Order — (3) Fugitive Defendant’s Failure to Appear at Court-Ordered, Remote Deposition Despite Court Warning That Sanctions Could Follow Disobedience Warrants Default Judgment — (4) District Court Afforded Wide Discretion in Interpreting Its Own Orders — (5) Filing a Notice of Appeal from a Non-Appealable Order (Here, a Discovery Order) Does Not Deprive the District Court of Jurisdiction over the Case

Archives
New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.
New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.

New York Office

© 2024 Joseph Hage Aaronson LLC  
Disclaimer | Attorney Advertising Notice | Legal Notice