Supplemental Jurisdiction — Issues of First Impression under State Law Leads Court to Decline to Exercise Federal Jurisdiction Following Dismissal of Federal Claims
From Judge Mark R. Kravitz’s opinion in Hernandez v. Carbone, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57264(D. Conn. July 29, 2008):
Having dismissed all of Mr. Hernandez's federal claims against Mr. Carbone, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state constitutional claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). The Second Circuit has advised district courts that "in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the [supplemental] jurisdiction doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims." Valencia ex rel. Franco v. Lee, 316 F.3d 299, 305 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). This case is more appropriate for declining supplemental jurisdiction than the "usual case" envisioned in Valencia. For this case raises novel and complex issues of first impression under Connecticut's Constitution that are singularly inappropriate for decision by a federal court. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1) (stating that courts have discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction when a "claim raises novel or complex issues of State law."); O'Connor v. Nevada, 27 F.3d 357, 363 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissing state constitutional claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1)). Therefore, in the interests of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Hernandez's claims for violation of the Connecticut Constitution.
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