New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.

Commercial Litigation and Arbitration

New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.
Commercial Litigation and Arbitration
« Back to Complex Lit Blog

Interrogatory Answers — Counsel’s Signature — Sanctions

Download PDF

Every lawyer knows that interrogatory answers are to be signed by the client, the party with substantive knowledge (Rule 33(b)(2)), not by the lawyer, who separately signs as to the objections (id.) and thereby certifies that the answers are true to the best of the lawyer’s knowledge, information and belief (Rule 26(g)(2)). Does it happen that lawyers, alone, execute interrogatory answers instead of clients? All the time. Interrogatory answers are processed as just other discovery papers and end up with lawyer signatures, alone, at the bottom. Does this matter? In Sample v. Miles, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 3027 (5th Cir. Feb. 9, 2007) (unpublished), the Fifth Circuit affirmed a $500 sanction against an AUSA in a pro se prisoner action on the theory that the plaintiff's interrogatories were ‛essentially“ never answered by the government because only the lawyer signed them, and the consequent failure to answer interrogatories was found to be sanctionable under Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(d). If the interrogatory answers had been accurate, it could have been a no harm, no foul, situation. But the interrogatory answers were wrong — they conflicted with the clients’ trial testimony. The Court held that the sanctioned attorney was ‛responsible for preparing witnesses and ensuring that their testimony would cohere with their earlier statements.“ That is an unfortunate locution, which makes it comforting that it appears only in an ‛unpublished“ opinion (in the wake of Fed.R.App.P. 32.1, ‛unpublished“ seems to mean that the opinion reaches the right result but the wording used to get there may not be perfect). If the earlier interrogatory answers were false, then the lawyer’s job certainly was to ensure correction under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(e)(2), failing which sanctions may be appropriate under Rule 37(c)(1), but it did not include ‛ensuring that their testimony would cohere with their earlier statements,“ and no doubt the Court did not mean to suggest the contrary.

Share this article:

Facebook
Twitter
LinkedIn
Email

Recent Posts

Rule 37 Dismissal Factors (10th Circuit) — Rule 37(d) Sanctions Apply Without Regard to Whether the Court Has Ordered the Delinquent Party to Appear for His, Her or Their Deposition

Rule 37 Dismissal Factors (Sixth Circuit) — Refusal to Answer Deposition Questions on Relevancy Grounds Is Not Valid Rule 30(c)(2) — Pro Se Deponent’s Attendance At Zoom Deposition While Driving A Semi, Refusing to Answer Questions, Inter Alia, Held Contumacious

Rule 26(a)(1) Disclosures and Rule 37 Preclusion: Rule 26 Does Not Require Disclosure of Legal Theories Underlying Damages Computations Provided Pursuant to 26(a)(1)(A)(i)

Rule 37 Sanctions: (1) Forfeiture of Objections to Produce Specific Categories of Documents (Including Tax Returns, Social Media Passwords) as Sanction for Violation of Discovery Order — (2) Default Judgment for Multiple Violations of Discovery Orders — (3) Ninth Circuit’s 5-Factor Test for Dismissal or Default Sanction — (4) Three Additional Factors Considered by Court of Appeals in Assessing Whether Lesser Sanctions Were Adequately Considered — (5) District Court Need Not Recite Each Factor: It Suffices If Record Permits Appellate Court to Apply Them — (6) Public Policy Favoring Disposition of Cases on the Merits Is Not Dispositive Where At Least 4 Factors “Support,” Or 3 Factors “Strongly Support,” Dismissal/Default — (7) And Lends Little Support to A Party Whose Conduct Impedes Adjudication on the Merits — (7) Order to Show Cause Why FRAP 38, § 1927 and Inherent Power Sanctions Should Not Issue for Multiple Misstatements Of Counsel At Oral Argument

Electronic Spoliation Sanctions: “Intent to Deprive” in Rule 37(e)(2) Means Willful Destruction of Evidence to Avoid Its Discovery by an Adverse Party — Relevant Circumstantial Evidence in Determining “Intent to Deprive” — Rule 37(e)(2)(C)’s Standards Trump Circuit’s Multi-Factor Test for Determining Whether Dismissal Is Appropriate — No Prejudice Required for 37(e)(2) Sanctions Because Intent to Deprive Creates Inference the Loss of Information Favored the Spoliator

Sanctions and Appealability — Fifth Circuit’s 2023 Survey of Circuit Cases Concerning Whether Judgment of Dismissal As a Sanction Bars Review of Earlier Sanctions Orders Due to Lack of Jurisdiction or Whether The Decision to Review Pre-Dismissal Sanctions Orders Is Prudential

Sanctions and Appealability — Prior Sanctions Orders Do Not Merge into Judgment of Dismissal Imposed As Sanction under Rules 16(f), 37(b) and 41(b) and Are Unappealable — Courts of Appeal Differ As to Whether This Lack of Reviewability Is Jurisdictional or Discretionary (Jurisdictional in Second Circuit)

Sanctions Enforcement and Appealability: Failure to Pay Rule 37 Sanctions and Otherwise Comply with Discovery Orders Leads to Dismissal under Rule 41(b) — Second Circuit Factors for Dismissal for Failure to Prosecute or Comply with Court Orders — Belated, Partial Compliance with Orders Does Not Deprive District Court of Discretion to Dismiss Based on Continuing Non-Compliance with Other Aspects of Orders — “Hopelessly Belated Compliance” with Court Orders Not Accorded Great Weight — Prior Sanctions Orders Do Not Merge into Judgment of Dismissal under Rule 41(b) And Are Unreviewable

Electronic Spoliation Sanctions: The “Intent to Deprive” Standard in Rule 37(e)(2) Is The Equivalent of Bad Faith in Other Spoliation Contexts — Bad Faith Generally Means Destruction For The Purpose Of Hiding Adverse Evidence — Mere Negligence Is Insufficient Because It Does Not Sustain An Inference of Consciousness of a Weak Case

Sanctions and Attorney-Client Privilege: Sham (Objectively Baseless, Bad Faith) Litigation for Antitrust Purposes Triggers Crime-Fraud Exception — Not All Frivolous Litigation Falls within Crime-Fraud Exception (But Some Sanctionable Behavior Clearly Does)

Archives
New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.
New York Attorneys JHA handles range the gamut of complex financial and commercial litigation and arbitration, including securities, RICO, corporate and contract disputes, credit default swaps, derivatives, and class, mass, and derivative actions. The firm also represents law firms in major disputes.

New York Office

© 2024 Joseph Hage Aaronson LLC  
Disclaimer | Attorney Advertising Notice | Legal Notice